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APPLYING FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY  
TO THE INTERPRETATION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS:  
THE BAN ON SPECIAL LAWS IN MARYLAND  
DAN FRIEDMAN∗
INTRODUCTION 
 
The last forty years have witnessed the creation and explosive 
evolution of theories of constitutional interpretation that purport to 
explain how federal constitutional courts should or must interpret 
constitutional texts.  At almost precisely the same time, a much small-
er movement has developed, calling for a renewed focus on state con-
stitutions as an independent source of constitutional protections.  In-
terestingly, however, academia has rarely attempted to apply these 
theories of constitutional interpretation to state constitutions.  This 
Article fills that void and applies constitutional interpretation theory 
to a misunderstood provision of the Maryland Constitution concern-
ing the prohibition on special laws—laws that relate to a particular 
person or class, as opposed to general laws, which apply to all.  In so 
doing, this Article examines the usefulness of existing theories of con-
stitutional interpretation, designed principally for interpreting the 
 
Copyright © 2012 by Dan Friedman. 
∗ Assistant Attorney General of Maryland and Counsel to the Maryland General As-
sembly.  Neither my boss, the Honorable Douglas F. Gansler, Attorney General of Mary-
land, nor my colleagues, nor our clients, the senators and delegates of the Maryland Gen-
eral Assembly, are responsible for this work and, therefore, cannot be bound by the views 
expressed herein.  Nonetheless, I hope it will make their important work easier and better.  
This Article arises at the intersection of (1) my representation of the State of Maryland at 
the trial court and on appeal in a case called Days Cove Reclamation Co. v. Maryland Depart-
ment of the Environment, 200 Md. App. 256, 27 A.3d 565 (2011); (2) teaching a course in 
theories of constitutional interpretation during the fall of 2009 at the University of Mary-
land Francis King Carey School of Law with my friend Richard C. Boldt; (3) preparation of 
my remarks on the importance of empathy and human judgment in judging delivered at 
the investiture of the Honorable Sherrie R. Bailey as an Associate Judge of the Circuit 
Court for Baltimore County; and (4) my previous work on Maryland state constitutional 
law.  Thanks are therefore due (1) to those who pushed hard to consider these issues in 
the Days Cove case: my co-counsel, Assistant Attorney General Kathryn M. Rowe; our oppos-
ing counsel, James J. Doyle, III, Esq.; and our trial judge, the Honorable Martin P. Welch, 
now the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City; (2) to Richard and our stu-
dents on whom I tried out the first of these ideas; and (3) to Judge Bailey for the honor of 
allowing me to speak on such a wonderful occasion.  Thanks also for research assistance to 
Katie Kruger, Matthew MacKenzie, and Pierce Murphy, who didn’t know what interning 
for me might include.  And thanks to Jeff Rosenfeld, proofreader extraordinaire. 
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federal constitution, for the new purpose of interpreting state consti-
tutions.   
This Article examines six specific theories of constitutional inter-
pretation: (1) textualism; (2) originalism; (3) moral reasoning; (4) 
structural reasoning; (5) comparative constitutional law; and (6) 
common law reasoning.  This Article argues that no preordained sys-
tem of interpretation can answer every possible constitutional ques-
tion.  Constitutional theory can inform, but never replace, human 
judgment.  Rather, judges should make use of all possible tools of in-
terpretation, including their own personal judgment constrained by a 
reasonable reading of the text as informed by the history of the provi-
sion’s adoption, subsequent judicial and scholarly interpretations, 
core moral values, political philosophy, and state and national tradi-
tions, to find the best possible interpretation. 
Part I of this Article examines the development and current field 
of constitutional interpretation theory.  Part II sketches the evolution 
of “New Judicial Federalism” and the awakening to the importance of 
state constitutional law.  Part III examines the leading case of Cities 
Service Co. v. Governor1 and the current interpretation of the Maryland 
special laws provision.  Part IV uses the prohibition on special laws in 
the Maryland Constitution to critique theories of federal interpreta-
tion as applied to state constitutions.2
I.  CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION THEORY 
  Part V demonstrates why the 
criticisms outlined in Part IV require judges to use all possible tools, 
including their own personal judgment, to properly interpret state 
constitutions, and concludes by summarizing a composite theory of 
state constitutional interpretation. 
Historically, constitutional theory provided tools to assist in con-
stitutional interpretation.  Chief Justice John Marshall’s opinion in 
McCulloch v. Maryland,3 for example, relied on a number of constitu-
tional interpretative tools, including “history, text, usage, structure, 
congressional action and inaction, logic, common law reasoning, and 
practical considerations”4
 
 1. 290 Md. 553, 431 A.2d 663 (1981). 
 to inform the Court’s understanding of 
 2. MD. CONST. art. III, § 33. 
 3. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 4. DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY: THE 
MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS 162–63 (2002) [hereinafter 
FARBER & SHERRY, SEEKING CERTAINTY]. 
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Congress’s power to create a national bank.5  Over time, however, 
“foundationalist” theorists have attempted to turn some of these in-
terpretive tools into exclusive theories of constitutional interpretation 
that provide the answer to every possible constitutional question.6
A history of modern constitutional theory must start with Lochner 
v. New York.
  
This Part briefly traces the three important marker posts in modern 
American federal constitutional theory and explains the limits of 
foundationalism. 
7  The 1905 decision overturned a democratically adopted 
state law protecting bakery workers based on the Court’s strongly held 
belief in the existence of a right to contract implicit in the “liberty” 
provision in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.8  
Over the next thirty years, the Supreme Court struck down nearly 200 
state laws based on this “liberty of contract” theory.9  By 1937, the Su-
preme Court reversed course and adopted a more deferential stan-
dard of review of social and economic legislation.  Today, Lochner is 
nearly universally condemned as a “wrong turn” in American constitu-
tional law.10  For most, the error of the Lochner era was the Court’s ag-
gressive judicial activism,11
 
 5. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 408 (noting that a determination that forming 
a national bank is outside the scope of constitutional authority would “impute to the fra-
mers of that instrument, when granting [specific] powers [to the government] for the 
public good, the intention of impeding their exercise by withholding a choice of 
means[]”). 
 and the lesson learned from that era was 
 6. See FARBER & SHERRY, SEEKING CERTAINTY, supra note 4, at 1 (noting that founda-
tionalism “seeks to ground all of constitutional law on a single foundation”).  
 7. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 8. Id. at 57–58.  
 9. See THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND 
INTERPRETATION 1392–99, 1431–87 (Norman J. Small & Lester S. Jayson eds., 1964) (list-
ing Supreme Court cases holding state laws unconstitutional on liberty of contract 
grounds).  
 10. I am not persuaded by modern attempts to resurrect the reputation of Lochner.  See, 
e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF 
LIBERTY 214 (2004); David E. Bernstein, The Story of Lochner v. New York: Impediment to the 
Growth of the Regulatory State, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 325, 326–27 (Michael C. 
Dorf ed., 2004); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF 
EMINENT DOMAIN 128–29 (1985); David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: 
Lochner and the Origins of Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1, 12–13 
(2003); David E. Bernstein, Lochner’s Legacy’s Legacy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2 (2003).  In the 
end, however, it doesn’t much matter to me if “the Lochner error” was as grave as conven-
tional wisdom suggests it was.  For present purposes, it is sufficient for Lochner to stand as 
the convenient archetype of misguided judicial activism in support of the Court’s idiosyn-
cratic economic theories.  See infra note 16.  
 11. See Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Three: The 
Lesson of Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1383, 1385 (2001) [hereinafter Friedman, Counterma-
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one of judicial restraint and deference to the decisions of democrati-
cally elected legislatures.12
In Brown v. Board of Education,
 
13 the second marker post in the 
development of constitutional theory, the Court overturned the estab-
lished “separate but equal” doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson,14 and found 
that racially segregated schools violated the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.15  At the time, Chief Justice Earl War-
ren’s Brown opinion was roundly condemned by southerners and se-
gregationists, and the opinion was also controversial amongst its sup-
porters.  Prominently, Professor Herbert Wechsler criticized the 
Brown decision, even though he agreed with the outcome, because he 
found the decision unsupported by “neutral principles” of constitu-
tional interpretation.16  It is commonplace to note that the Brown de-
cision is inconsistent with the original understanding of the framers 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, who in the same legislative session 
approved segregated schools in the District of Columbia.17  Today, 
however, despite some minor continuing criticism of its theoretical 
reasoning, Brown has achieved wide acceptance in the legal communi-
ty and American society.18
The third important marker post is the privacy decisions of Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, which overturned a state law prohibiting contra-
ceptive use by married couples,
 
19 and Roe v. Wade, which invalidated 
most state prohibitions on abortion.20
 
joritarian Difficulty] (noting that “scholars [have] painted Lochner as the primary example of 
judicial activism”). 
  Opponents have attacked these 
 12. Id. 
 13. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 14. 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896). 
 15. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. 
 16. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 
1, 31–34 (1959).  There are also those who disagree with Wechsler’s assessment that Chief 
Justice Warren’s Brown opinion violated neutral principles of constitutional interpretation 
or that a rejection of neutral principles was necessary to the result.  See RICHARD KLUGER, 
SIMPLE JUSTICE 711–13 (1975).  My point isn’t to resolve that controversy but rather to 
identify the necessity of the possibility of transformative decisions, and suggest the conven-
tional account of Brown as an archetype.  See supra note 10. 
 17. See infra note 26.  
 18. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. 
REV. 947, 952 (1995) [hereinafter McConnell, Desegregation Decisions] (“[T]he moral au-
thority of Brown [is now so strong] that if any particular theory does not produce the con-
clusion that Brown was correctly decided, the theory is seriously discredited.”).  But see 
RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY THE JUDICIARY 117–33 (1977) (criticizing Brown on his-
torical grounds). 
 19. 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).  
 20. 410 U.S. 113, 164–65 (1973). 
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decisions relentlessly for allegedly writing the Court’s personal politi-
cal preferences into constitutional doctrine.21  As with Brown, many of 
those who support the outcomes question the legal reasoning and 
textual bases for the decisions.22
In my view, any credible theory of constitutional interpretation 
must avoid the problem of Lochner while simultaneously allowing the 
possibility of Brown.  An interpretive theory must sufficiently cabin 
judicial discretion to avoid allowing the personal preferences of the 
Justices to guide decision making, as was the case in Lochner, while al-
lowing sufficient judicial discretion to permit the change of course 
that Brown’s rejection of Plessy symbolizes.  It is my view that no preor-
dained system of interpretation can steer a course that safely avoids 
the Lochner problem but also permits the result in Brown.  That’s the 
problem with foundationalism.  To steer the proper course requires 
both the exercise of human judgment and the risk of human error.  
Our human system both created and corrected the Lochner error and 
reached the transformative decision in Brown. 
 
Despite this, many have tried to create foundationalist interpre-
tive systems.  Justice Hugo Black, for instance, was a leading propo-
nent of textualism and judicial restraint.  Dating from his appoint-
ment to the Supreme Court in 1937 until his retirement in 1971, he 
argued in his judicial opinions that only these principles together 
could properly constrain the excess of the Lochner era.  Despite the 
constraints imposed by his interpretive theory, Justice Black joined 
the unanimous Court in the Brown decision.  He dissented in Griswold, 
however, and died before the decision in Roe.  
Originalism, another influential theory of interpretation, began 
in the 1970s principally as a critique of the privacy decisions of Gris-
wold and Roe.  From those beginnings, originalism has grown to a 
complete foundationalist interpretive theory that purports to provide 
answers to all questions of constitutional interpretation.23
 
 21. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. 
L.J. 1, 7–11 (1971) (criticizing Griswold as “fail[ing] every test of neutrality”). 
  Under ori-
 22. See, e.g., ARCHIBALD COX, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN 
GOVERNMENT 112–14 (1976) (arguing that while there is sufficient connection between 
the Due Process Clause and a woman’s right to an abortion, the Roe Court failed to con-
front the issue on principled terms); DAVID STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 92–95 
(2010) (supporting Roe but opining that the question remains open as to whether the 
woman’s right should have overridden the state’s interest); Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have 
an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 703–05 (1975) (arguing that while it is ap-
propriate for courts to protect values not enumerated in the Constitution, courts and 
commentators have not “clearly stated and articulately defended” this doctrine).  
 23. See FARBER & SHERRY, SEEKING CERTAINTY, supra note 4, at 1 (noting that founda-
tionalism “seeks to ground all of constitutional law on a single foundation”).  
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ginalism, judicial review is an aberrational, antimajoritarian practice 
that can only be justified if based on the original public understand-
ing of the meaning of a constitutional provision at the time of its 
adoption.  Originalism’s adherents take the position that it is the only 
legitimate means of judicial review.  By attempting to eliminate judi-
cial discretion (although whether its adherents are successful in this 
project is an open question), originalism attempts to avoid the Lochner 
problem.24  Originalism has a much harder time allowing for the pos-
sibility of Brown,25 particularly because the historical record simply 
does not support the conclusion that the framers or ratifiers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment intended school desegregation.26
Most modern constitutional interpretive theory arises either in 
support of, or in opposition to, originalism.  Moral reasoning, as ad-
vocated by Ronald Dworkin, for example, rejects the whole premise of 
originalism and instead urges judges engaging in constitutional inter-
pretation to use moral philosophy explicitly.
  More gen-
erally, originalism is an inherently conservative interpretive theory 
and is unlikely to be capable of the flexibility Brown demands. 
27
Other modern interpretative theories are not foundationalist be-
cause they do not purport to create a single one-size-fits-all method of 
  While such a system 
would clearly allow judges the flexibility to adopt the Brown decision, 
it is unclear how moral philosophy would avoid, except in retrospect, 
the Lochner problem.  Common law constitutional interpretation takes 
its cues from the traditional common law method and, relying on no-
tions of traditionalism and conventionalism, attempts to construct a 
system capable of avoiding Lochner while permitting Brown.  Whether 
it succeeds is an open question. 
 
 24. See Jack M. Balkin, “Wrong the Day It Was Decided”: Lochner and Constitutional Histo-
ricism, 85 B.U. L. REV. 677, 690 (2005) (explaining that originalism was initially “designed 
to promote judicial restraint”). 
 25. See Michael W. McConnell, The Originalist Case for Brown v. Board of Education, 19 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 457, 457 (1996) (“An impressive array of academic authorities . . . 
ha[ve] come to the conclusion that under the original understanding of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, racial segregation of public schools was constitutionally permissible.”); 
McConnell, Desegregation Decisions, supra note 18, at 949–52 (explaining that the standard 
understanding of Brown is that it conflicts with the Constitution’s original meaning); Mi-
chael W. McConnell, The Originalist Justification for Brown: A Reply to Professor Klarman, 81 
VA. L. REV. 1937, 1937, 1944 (1995) (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment was unders-
tood at the time to forbid school segregation but conceding that the historical record is 
somewhat unreliable).  
 26. See McConnell, Desegregation Decisions, supra note 18, at 952 (“In the fractured dis-
cipline of constitutional law, there is something very close to a consensus that Brown was 
inconsistent with the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .”). 
 27. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 2 (1996) [hereinafter DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW]. 
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constitutional interpretation.  Nevertheless, adherents of these theo-
ries believe they provide important information about interpreting 
constitutions.  This category includes structural reasoning, which re-
quires an interpreter to reason not only from the text of the Constitu-
tion but also from the “structure and relation” created by the text.28  
Similarly, comparative constitutional law suggests that a constitutional 
interpreter may be aided by the interpretations of similar constitu-
tions.29
II.  NEW JUDICIAL FEDERALISM 
 
Scholars suggest that a renewed interest in state constitutions be-
gan almost forty years ago with the California Supreme Court’s deci-
sion to invalidate the death penalty based exclusively on a provision in 
California’s bill of rights.30  The idea spread with the publication of a 
1977 law review article by Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., which noted 
that “[s]tate constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties, their 
protections often extending beyond those required by the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of federal law.”31  In the years that followed, 
rivers of ink were spilled in judicial opinions and law review articles 
over the legitimacy of state courts interpreting state constitutional 
provisions differently than the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted simi-
lar, and even identical, provisions of the federal constitution.  In ans-
wering these legitimacy concerns, Oregon Supreme Court Justice 
Hans A. Linde argued that state courts should apply a “first things 
first” approach, in which the state court always interprets its constitu-
tion first without regard to the federal interpretation.32
 
 28. See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
7 (1969) (describing one theory of constitutional interpretation as a “method of inference 
from the structures and relationships created by the constitution in all its parts or in some 
principal part”). 
  By contrast, 
Washington Supreme Court Justice Robert F. Utter advocated what he 
called a “dual sovereignty” model in which state and federal interpre-
 29. See Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 
1225, 1228 (1999) [hereinafter Tushnet, Comparative Constitutional Law] (describing com-
parative constitutional law as the possibility of learning from constitutional experience 
elsewhere).  
 30. ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 119–20 (2009) 
[hereinafter WILLIAMS, STATE CONSTITUTIONS] (citing People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880 
(Cal. 1972), superseded by constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 27). 
 31. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 
HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977). 
 32. Hans A. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States’ Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. 
REV. 379, 383 (1980). 
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tation would be conducted in every case.33  Courts in New Jersey, 
Washington, and Pennsylvania, among others, have adopted at vari-
ous times a “criteria approach” under which they identify a series of 
factors that will justify departure from established federal precedent.34  
Some courts, commentators, and even state constitutional provisions, 
reflecting these same legitimacy concerns, reject independent state 
analysis entirely and tie the analysis of a state’s provision directly to 
that of the federal analog.35
As Counsel to the Maryland General Assembly, I rarely face these 
legitimacy questions.  More frequently, my time is spent interpreting 
those provisions of the Maryland Constitution where there is no Su-
preme Court interpretation of an analogous provision of the federal 
constitution to “cast a shadow”
  These traditional forms of state constitu-
tional analysis ask when it is legitimate for us to interpret a state’s con-
stitution. 
36 over the analysis.37
 
 33. Robert F. Utter, The Practice of Principled Decision-Making in State Constitutionalism: 
Washington’s Experience, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1153, 1160 (1992); Robert F. Utter, Swimming in 
the Jaws of the Crocodile: State Court Comment on Federal Constitutional Issues when Disposing of 
Cases on State Constitutional Grounds, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1025, 1029–30 (1985). 
  My colleagues 
 34. WILLIAMS, STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 30, at 146–57 (discussing Common-
wealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991); State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808 (Wash. 1986); 
and State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952 (N.J. 1982)).  
 35. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12; Eastwood Mall, Inc. v. Slan-
co, 626 N.E.2d 59, 61 (Ohio 1994) (tying interpretation of article I, section 11 of the Ohio 
Constitution to the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the First Amendment); James A. 
Gardner, State Constitutional Rights as Resistance to National Power: Toward a Functional Theory 
of State Constitutions, 91 GEO. L.J. 1003, 1058 (2003) (“[A] state constitution must generally 
be interpreted with one eye on the U.S. Constitution . . . .”).  But see Robert F. Williams, A 
“Row of Shadows”: Pennsylvania’s Misguided Lockstep Approach to Its State Constitutional Equality 
Doctrine, 3 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 343, 374–75 (1993) [hereinafter Williams, Misguided] (ar-
guing that it is a mistake for courts to interpret their state constitutional provisions in 
“lockstep” with the federal constitution). 
 36. The metaphor of the Supreme Court casting a shadow over state court decision 
making is from a seminal article by Professor Robert F. Williams.  Robert F. Williams, In the 
Supreme Court’s Shadow: Legitimacy of State Rejection of Supreme Court Reasoning and Result, 35 
S.C. L. REV. 353, 356 (1984). 
 37. That is not to say that the Office of the Attorney General (and specifically the Of-
fice of Counsel to the General Assembly) does not attempt to predict those circumstances 
in which the Court of Appeals of Maryland might give a divergent interpretation to a Mary-
land Constitution provision from that given by the Supreme Court of an analogous federal 
provision.  Marylanders are frequently reminded by their courts that such divergent inter-
pretation is possible.  See, e.g., Marshall v. State, 415 Md. 248, 259–60 n.4, 999 A.2d 1029, 
1035 n.4 (2010) (stating that there is no need for a Maryland constitutional provision to 
always be interpreted or applied in the same manner as its federal counterpart); Pack 
Shack, Inc. v. Howard County, 377 Md. 55, 64–65 n.3, 832 A.2d 170, 176 n.3 (2003) 
(same); Attorney Gen. v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 705, 426 A.2d 929, 941 (1981) (describing 
the equal protection guaranties of the Fourteenth Amendment and of article 24 of the 
Maryland Declaration of Rights as “independent [and] capable of divergent effect” but 
also “so intertwined that they, in essence, form a double helix, each complementing the 
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and I are asked to determine if a bill will be upheld if challenged un-
der the “descriptive title” rule.38  We are asked if an amendment 
should be rebuffed because the resultant bill would violate the “one 
subject” rule.39  We make sure the state budget is adopted in a man-
ner that is consistent with the governing constitutional rules.40  With 
these questions, there is no such legitimacy concern—we must inde-
pendently interpret the state constitution.  Instead of when, I am 
much more interested in the question of how we should interpret the 
state constitution.  The literature here is much sparser.  As Professor 
G. Alan Tarr stated, “Constitutional theorists have continued to an-
nounce theories of constitutional interpretation that are really only 
theories of how to interpret a single constitution . . . [while] state jur-
ists and state constitutional scholars, with a few isolated exceptions, 
have ignored recent constitutional theory in interpreting state consti-
tutions.”41  To begin to fill this apparent void, in this Article I use the 
techniques of constitutional interpretation created for the federal 
constitution to help give meaning to a state constitutional provision.42  
I have selected Maryland’s prohibition on special laws, article III, sec-
tion 33, precisely because there is no analogous federal provision.  It 
thus avoids the question of what to do when a U.S. Supreme Court in-
terpretation of an analogous provision casts a shadow over the state 
court’s interpretation of its own provision.43
 
other”).  Unfortunately, however, Maryland courts have not given much guidance about 
when they will follow the federal interpretation and when they will diverge.  See WILLIAMS, 
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 
  Instead, Maryland courts 
30, at 197 (describing the Maryland courts’ approach as 
a “mixed message”). 
 38. MD. CONST. art. III, § 29. 
 39. MD. CONST. art. III, § 29. 
 40. MD. CONST. art. III, § 52. 
 41. G. Alan Tarr, Constitutional Theory and State Constitutional Interpretation, 22 RUTGERS 
L.J. 841, 842–43 (1991) (footnote omitted). 
 42. In important respects, this Article is another attempt to fulfill the research agenda 
for state constitutional law set forth by my friend and mentor, Professor Robert F. Williams 
of the Rutgers School of Law-Camden.  Robert F. Williams, Foreword: Looking Back at the New 
Judicial Federalism’s First Generation, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. xiii, x–xv (1996). 
 43. Interestingly, there is a U.S. Supreme Court decision, by Justice Benjamin Cardozo, 
interpreting Maryland’s special laws prohibition.  Williams v. Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36 
(1933).  It is well-written and well-reasoned and clearly explains Maryland’s special laws 
jurisprudence—at least as it existed in 1933:   
Time with its tides brings new conditions which must be cared for by new laws.  
Sometimes the new conditions affect the members of a class.  If so, the correct-
ing statute must apply to all alike.  Sometimes the new conditions affect one only 
or a few.  If so the correcting statute may be as narrow as the mischief.  The 
[Maryland] Constitution does not prohibit special laws inflexibly and always.  It 
permits them when there are special evils with which existing general laws are 
incompetent to cope.  The special public purpose will then sustain the special 
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may independently ascertain the meaning of this provision without 
any question about the legitimacy of such an enterprise. 
III.  THE CURRENT INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE III, SECTION 33—THE 
SPECIAL LAWS PROVISION 
A.  Cities Service Co. v. Governor 
The current text of article III, section 33 of the Maryland Consti-
tution provides in relevant part that “the General Assembly shall pass 
no special Law, for any case, for which provision has been made, by 
an existing General Law.”44  Most generally, the prohibition bars laws 
that give special treatment to the privileged few.  The leading case in-
terpreting this provision is Cities Service Co. v. Governor, which con-
cerned the laws governing the sale of gasoline.45  Under Maryland’s 
“divestiture law,” producers or refiners of petroleum products are 
generally prohibited from operating retail gasoline service stations.46
 
form.  The problem in last analysis is one of legislative policy, with a wide margin 
of discretion conceded to the lawmakers.  Only in cases of plain abuse will there 
be revision by the courts.  If the evil to be corrected can be seen to be merely 
fanciful, the injustice or the wrong illusory, the courts may intervene and strike 
the special statute down.  If special circumstances have developed, and circums-
tances of such a nature as to call for a new rule, the special act will stand.     
  
Id. at 46 (citations omitted).  Because the Supreme Court was interpreting a provision of 
the state’s constitution, however, the claim cannot be made that the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland ought to defer to the Supreme Court’s interpretation. 
 44. MD. CONST. art. III, § 33.  The full text of section 33 reads as follows:  
The General Assembly shall not pass local, or special Laws, in any of the follow-
ing enumerated cases, viz.: For extending the time for the collection of taxes; 
granting divorces; changing the name of any person; providing for the sale of 
real estate, belonging to minors, or other persons laboring under legal disabili-
ties, by executors, administrators, guardians or trustees; giving effect to informal, 
or invalid deeds or wills; refunding money paid into the State Treasury, or releas-
ing persons from their debts, or obligations to the State, unless recommended by 
the Governor, or officers of the Treasury Department.  And the General Assem-
bly shall pass no special Law, for any case, for which provision has been made, by 
an existing General Law.  The General Assembly, at its first Session after the 
adoption of this Constitution, shall pass General Laws, providing for the cases 
enumerated in this section, which are not already adequately provided for, and 
for all other cases, where a General Law can be made applicable. 
Id.  
 45. 290 Md. 553, 555, 431 A.2d 663, 665 (1981). 
 46. Id. at 555–56, 431 A.2d at 665–66.  Maryland’s “divestiture law” provided that:  
[A]fter July 1, 1974, no producer or refiner of petroleum products shall open a 
retail service station in Maryland and operate it with company personnel or a 
subsidiary company . . . [and] after July 1, 1975, no producer or refiner of petro-
leum products shall operate any retail service station in Maryland with company 
personnel or a subsidiary company, regardless of when the station may have 
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In 1979, the Maryland General Assembly adopted a “mass merchan-
diser exemption”47 to the divestiture law.48  The terms of the mass 
merchandiser exemption were drafted so that only one retailer, 
Montgomery Ward, would ever be able to own gasoline service sta-
tions.49  Judge John C. Eldridge, writing for a unanimous Court of 
Appeals, undertook the first modern analysis of the special laws pro-
hibition of article III, section 33 to determine the validity of this mass 
merchandiser exemption.50
Judge Eldridge’s analysis began by noting that “a statute is not 
prohibited by the [special laws] restriction unless two conditions are 
met: (1) it must be a ‘special’ law; (2) there must be no provision for 
the matter in an existing general law.”
 
51  He then described the diffi-
culties in defining a “special” law.  First, he derided as “often re-
peated . . . [but] not particularly helpful,” the nearly tautological de-
finition found in many cases: A special law is “‘a law for a special case’ 
or for ‘a particular case’ or for ‘individual cases.’”52
 
been opened, and that all stations must be operated by retail service station 
dealers. 
  The court found 
the following definition more instructive: “[a] special law is one that 
Id. (citing MD. CODE ANN., art. 56, § 157E(b), (c), (g), (h), and (i) (1957, 1979 Repl. Vol., 
1980 Cum. Supp.)).  
 47. The mass merchandiser exception  
exempted from the divestiture requirement a retail service station in operation 
on January 1, 1979, that was operated by a subsidiary of a petroleum producer or 
refiners of January 1, 1979, on a year to year basis as long as the subsidiary’s gross 
revenues from petroleum products sold in Maryland are less than two percent of 
the subsidiary’s gross revenues from all retail operation in Maryland.  
Id. at 557–58, 431 A.2d at 666–67 (citing MD. CODE ANN., art. 56, § 157E(c)(2) 
(1957)).   
 48. Id. at 557, 431 A.2d at 666. 
 49. Id. at 570–71, 431 A.2d at 673. 
 50. Id. at 555, 431 A.2d at 665. 
 51. Id. at 567, 431 A.2d at 671.  There are very few Maryland cases, none recent, ad-
dressing the requirement that there be no provision for the matter in general law.  See, e.g., 
State v. Ambrose, 191 Md. 353, 368, 62 A.2d 359, 365 (1948) (holding that a statute that 
permitted the Board of Public Works to abandon certain oyster condemnation proceed-
ings did not violate article III, section 33 of the Maryland Constitution because there was 
no corresponding general law); Gebhart v. Hill, 189 Md. 135, 140–41, 54 A.2d 315, 318 
(1947) (holding that a statute enabling World War II veterans under the age of twenty-one 
to participate in the advantages of the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act was not invalid un-
der article III, section 33 of the Maryland Constitution because there was no correspond-
ing existing general law). 
 52. Cities Serv. Co., 290 Md. at 567, 431 A.2d at 671 (citing Reyes v. Prince George’s 
County, 281 Md. 279, 305, 380 A.2d 12, 26 (1977); Potomac Sand & Gravel Co. v. Gover-
nor, 266 Md. 358, 378, 293 A.2d 241, 521–52 (1972); Jones v. House of Reformation, 176 
Md. 43, 55, 3 A.2d 728, 734 (1939); Norris v. Baltimore, 172 Md. 667, 682, 192 A. 531, 538 
(1937); Baltimore v. Starr Church, 106 Md. 281, 289, 67 A. 261, 265 (1937); McGrath v. 
State, 46 Md. 631, 634 (1877)). 
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relates to particular persons or things of a class, as distinguished from 
a general law which applies to all persons or things of a class,”53 but 
recognized that this definition, too, is difficult to apply as it depends 
entirely on the “determination of what constitutes [a] ‘class.’”54  Im-
portantly, Judge Eldridge recognized that prior cases had approved 
legislation affecting a single entity—a so-called “class of one”—where 
that entity “constituted a class of itself, and similar conditions did not 
exist with any other company,”55 thus undermining the utility of a de-
finition based on the concept of “class.”56
In Cities Service, Judge Eldridge created a new, two-step test for 
determining if a law is a “special” law in violation of the constitutional 
prohibition.  First, he said that a court should consider whether the 
legislation violates the historical purpose of the constitutional provi-
sion.
   
57  Through reference to a series of old cases,58 Judge Eldridge 
apparently, although not explicitly, identified the historical purpose 
of the special laws prohibition as preventing the grant of special privi-
leges to influential people.59  Second, Judge Eldridge listed certain 
additional “considerations and factors” that courts have considered in 
assessing whether laws are special:60 (1) whether the “underlying pur-
pose” of the legislation is “actually intended” to “benefit or burden” a 
particular member or members of a class rather than the entire 
class;61
 
 53. Id. (quoting Prince George’s County v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 113 Md. 179, 183, 77 
A. 433, 434 (1910)).  
 (2) whether particular people or entities are identified by the 
 54. Id. at 567, 431 A.2d at 672.   
 55. Id. at 567–68, 431 A.2d at 671–72 (quoting Baltimore v. United Rys. & Elec. Co., 
126 Md. 39, 48–49, 94 A. 378, 381 (1915)); see also Jones v. House of Reformation, 176 Md. 
43, 55, 3 A.2d 728, 734 (1939) (approving legislation creating a “class of one”). 
 56. See Cities Serv. Co., 290 Md. at 567, 431 A.2d at 672 (noting that this definition “pro-
vides no mechanical rule for deciding cases, as it depends upon a determination of what 
constitutes a ‘class’”). 
 57. Id. at 568, 431 A.2d at 672. 
 58. Judge Eldridge’s opinion did not explore the records of the constitutional conven-
tions that adopted and readopted the provision. 
 59. Cities Serv. Co., 290 Md. at 568–69, 431 A.2d at 672 (citing Jones v. House of Refor-
mation, 176 Md. 43, 56, 3 A.2d 728, 734–35 (1939); Norris v. Baltimore, 172 Md. 667, 682–
83, 192 A. 531 (1937); Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. United Rys. & Elec. Co., 126 
Md. 39, 52, 94 A. 378, 382 (1915); Baltimore v. United Rys. & Elec. Co., 126 Md. 39, 52 
(1915); Montague v. State, 54 Md. 481, 490 (1880)).  Importantly, many cases that follow 
Cities Service Co. skip this first step.  See, e.g., State v. Burning Tree Club, Inc., 315 Md. 254, 
272–76, 554 A.2d 366, 375–77 (1989).   
 60. Cities Serv. Co., 290 Md. at 569–70, 431 A.2d at 672–73. 
 61. Id. at 569, 431 A.2d at 672 (citing Beauchamp v. Somerset County Sanitary 
Comm’n, 256 Md. 541, 549, 261 A.2d 461, 464–65 (1970) (striking down a statute that ef-
fectively “applie[d] to one taxpayer only and to the lands of that one taxpayer”); Littleton 
v. City of Hagerstown, 150 Md. 163, 176–77, 132 A. 773, 779 (1926) (holding that a statute 
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statute;62 (3) the substance and “practical effect” of a statute, not 
simply its form;63 (4) whether particular entities or individuals sought 
and obtained special advantages or if other similar entities or individ-
uals were discriminated against by the legislation;64 (5) whether the 
general law, on its own, is adequate to serve the public need purpor-
tedly addressed by the special law;65
 
exempting the city of Hagerstown from the control of the Public Service Commission was 
an unconstitutional special law)).   
 (6) whether the statute’s distinc-
 62. Cities Serv. Co., 290 Md. at 569, 431 A.2d at 672–73 (citing Reyes v. Prince George’s 
County, 281 Md. 279, 305–06, 380 A.2d 12, 26–27 (1977)).  The Cities Service court was 
careful to note, however, that courts have upheld statutes in which specific entities were 
named, Cities Serv. Co., 290 Md. at 569, 431 A.2d at 673 (citing Baltimore v. United Rys. & 
Elec. Co., 126 Md. 39, 52–53, 94 A. 378, 382 (1915)), and have rejected statutes in which 
the specific entities were not named.  Id. (citing Beauchamp v. Somerset County Sanitary 
Comm’n, 256 Md. 541, 549, 261 A.2d 461, 464–65 (1970); Littleton v. City of Hagerstown, 
150 Md. 163, 176–77, 132 A. 773, 779 (1926)).   
 63.  Cities Serv. Co., 290 Md. at 569–70, 431 A.2d at 673 (citing Beauchamp, 256 Md. at 
549, 261 A.2d at 464–65 (demonstrating that the practical effect of the law in question li-
mited its effect to only one American Legion Post); Littleton, 150 Md. at 177, 132 A. at 779 
(stating that “[i]t is the object to be accomplished and not the form of the act which de-
termines the validity of a classification”); United Rys. & Elec. Co. 126 Md. at 52, 94 A. at 382 
(noting that, when there is only one company to be impacted by a specific law, it has the 
same effect as if the company was specifically named in the statute)). 
 64. Cities Serv. Co., 290 Md. at 570, 431 A.2d at 673 (citing United Rys. & Elec. Co., 126 
Md. at 51, 94 A. at 382 (considering whether either the subject of the law or the maker of 
the law received special advantages); Littleton, 150 Md. at 182, 132 A. at 781 (noting that 
“unreasonable discrimination” is sufficient to “invalidate [a] classification”)). 
 65. Cities Serv. Co., 290 Md. at 570, 431 A.2d at 673 (citing Jones v. House of Reforma-
tion, 176 Md. 43, 58, 3 A.2d 728, 735 (1939) (noting that special laws are not prohibited 
“inflexibly and always,” but are permitted when there is a “special public purpose” that can 
“sustain the special form”)).  Interestingly, while this factor was repeated by Chief Judge 
Robert C. Murphy in the special laws case following Cities Service Company, State v. Good Sa-
maritan Hospital of Maryland, Inc., 299 Md. 310, 330, 473 A.2d 892, 902 (1984), this factor 
disappeared from the list recited in Judge Eldridge’s next special laws opinion, State v. 
Burning Tree Club, Inc., 315 Md. 254, 273–74, 554 A.2d 366, 376 (1989).  Of course, I can-
not know why Judge Eldridge omitted this factor from his Burning Tree opinion or if this 
factor remains part of the governing law.  I can, however, note my view that the determina-
tion of the “adequacy” of a law is a particularly legislative function, poorly suited for judi-
cial review.  The Days Cove case presents a good example of this.  Existing law provided a 
statewide application process for a rubble landfill permit.  See Days Cove Reclamation Co. 
v. Md. Dep’t of the Env’t, No. 24-C-07-003455, mem. op. at 2 (Md. Cir. Ct. Balt. Aug. 25, 
2008) (on file with author) (noting that Maryland Department of the Environment had a 
three-phase permit process for rubble landfill operation).  The legislature adopted Chap-
ter 161 in 2006, which reflected its determination that the existing permit process was not 
restrictive enough in two parts of the State: (1) within a four-mile radius around Unicorn 
Lake in Queen Anne’s County and a sliver of Kent County; and (2) within a one-mile ra-
dius of certain creeks and tributaries of the Potomac River in Prince George’s County.  Id. 
at 3.  The trial court in the Days Cove case, applying the Cities Service test, made a specific 
finding that the pre-existing “permit process is more than adequate to protect environ-
mentally sensitive areas, such as Unicorn Lake.  Consequently, [the trial] court finds that 
there are adequate provisions for the matter in existing general law.”  Id. at 9.  The Court 
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tions or classifications are arbitrary or unreasonable;66 and (7) wheth-
er the enactment, although it affects only one entity currently, would 
apply to other similar entities in the future.67
B.  Criticism of Cities Service 
  
There are many grounds on which to criticize the decision of the 
Court of Appeals in Cities Service.  As a procedural matter, the court 
does not explain how the two steps are supposed to relate to one 
another, except that none of the additional “considerations and fac-
tors” are “conclusive in all cases.”68
There are also substantive concerns.  First and foremost, Judge 
Eldridge’s formulation eliminates the “reasonableness” test that ex-
isted in some pre-Cities Service Maryland cases
  Moreover, the court did not state 
what standard will be applied if a law is found to be special. 
69 and in the decisions of 
the courts in every other state in the Union.70  Second, the Cities Ser-
vice test fails to reflect—or even mention—the presumption of consti-
tutionality that attaches to all bills passed by the legislature.  This is a 
serious defect in the Cities Service test that reflects a complete break 
with prior cases.71
Third, one of the additional “considerations and factors” asks, in 
part, if the legislature “actually intended” to “benefit or burden” a 
   
 
of Special Appeals reversed, 200 Md. App. 256, 259, 27 A.3d 565, 567 (2011).  My point is 
not to quarrel with the trial court’s application of the standard but rather to suggest that 
the standard is completely inappropriate.  It is the legislature’s duty—not the court’s—to 
decide which laws are “adequate.” 
 66. Cities Serv. Co., 290 Md. at 570, 431 A.2d at 673 (citing Littleton, 150 Md. at 176, 132 
A. at 778 (noting that the “basis of classification [must] bear[] a reasonable relation to the 
subject-matter of the act”)). 
 67. This last factor, while clearly discussed by the court in the Cities Service case, Cities 
Service Co., 290 Md. at 571–72, 431 A.2d at 673–74, was not added to the list of “considera-
tions” until Burning Tree Club, Inc., 315 Md. at 274, 554 A.2d at 376.  See, e.g., Reyes, 281 Md. 
at 305–06, 380 A.2d at 27 (determining that, despite the existence of only one entity im-
pacted by a statute, it did not qualify as a special law because of the possibility of additional 
impacted entities in the future).   
 68. Cities Serv. Co., 290 Md. at 569, 431 A.2d at 672.  It is my understanding that this is 
fairly typical of Judge Eldridge’s opinions, in which he prefers open-ended “considera-
tions” or “factors” to “elements” or “checklists.” 
 69. See, e.g., Littleton, 150 Md. at 183, 132 A. at 781. 
 70. For a discussion of the approach to special laws of other states, see infra text ac-
companying notes 218–224. 
 71. See, e.g., Beauchamp v. Somerset County Sanitary Comm’n, 256 Md. 546, 547, 261 
A.2d 461, 463–64 (1970) (“[A] statute is presumptively constitutional and the courts are 
reluctant to declare a statute unconstitutional if, by any construction, it can be sustained.”) 
(citations omitted); see also Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp. v. Malory, 143 Md. App. 327, 352–
53, 795 A.2d 107, 122 (2001) (discussing presumption of constitutionality in post-Cities Ser-
vices decisions) (citations omitted). 
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particular member or members of a class, rather than the entire 
class.72
Fourth, I am skeptical of a court’s ability to properly assess “legis-
lative intent.”  It is my view that courts, often unfamiliar with the give 
and take of the legislative process, place much too great of an empha-
sis on the words spoken at legislative hearings and in floor debates, 
but pay insufficient attention to the underlying motivations of legisla-
tors.
  I am not sure why the legislature’s intent is particularly rele-
vant: either the bill creates an improper subclass or it does not.   
73  Reliance on legislative intent creates a disincentive for legisla-
tors to be candid about their reasons for supporting a piece of legisla-
tion.74
Fifth, while I agree that a law that benefits only some members of a 
class may be an unconstitutional special law, I do not agree with Judge 
Eldridge that a law that burdens only some members of the class will 
violate the constitutional prohibition.
  That possible lack of candor is detrimental to our democracy.   
75  Similarly, while I agree that 
“[i]f a particular individual or business sought and received special ad-
vantages from the Legislature . . . this would support a conclusion that 
the Act constitutes a prohibited special law,”76 I disagree with the fur-
ther statement that “if other similar individuals or businesses were dis-
criminated against by the legislation, this would support a conclusion 
that the Act constitutes a prohibited special law.”77  The cases cited by 
Judge Eldridge do not support this notion.  In fact, no reported Mary-
land appellate opinion has ever invalidated a statute under article III, 
section 33 because it burdened, as opposed to benefitted, specific indi-
viduals.78
 
 72. Cities Serv. Co., 290 Md. at 569, 431 A.2d at 672.   
  The history of the provision does not support this interpre-
 73. See generally Jack Schwartz & Amanda Stakem Conn, The Court of Appeals at the Cock-
tail Party: The Use and Misuse of Legislative History, 54 MD. L. REV. 432, 457–59 (1995) (dis-
cussing courts’ difficulties in assessing legislative history).  See also Muskin v. State Dep’t of 
Assessments and Taxation, 422 Md. 544, 30 A.3d 962 (2011) (deriding the legislature’s 
evidence of ground rent problems as “anecdotal”).  In Days Cove, the Court of Special Ap-
peals declined to assess the legislature’s intent in adopting the prohibition on rubble land-
fills in certain parts of the state.  200 Md. App. 256, 270, 27 A.3d 565, 574 (2011) (citing 
Workers’ Comp. Comm’n v. Driver, 336 Md. 105, 118, 647 A.2d 96, 103 (1994)).  
 74. Cf. Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional Practice, 61 
STAN. L. REV. 573, 610 & n.157 (2008) (“Congress may not always have an incentive to ex-
press its views candidly . . . .”).  
 75. See Cities Serv. Co., 290 Md. at 569, 431 A.2d at 672 (considering whether the pur-
pose of the legislation was to either benefit or burden a particular member or subclass). 
 76. Id. at 570, 431 A.2d at 673 (emphasis added). 
 77. Id. (emphasis added). 
 78. Cf. Beauchamp v. Somerset County Sanitary Comm’n, 256 Md. 541, 549, 261 A.2d 
461, 464 (1970) (striking down a statute that effectively benefitted only one taxpayer); Lit-
tleton v. City of Hagerstown, 150 Md. 163, 176–77, 132 A. 773, 779 (1926) (holding that a 
statute benefitting only one entity was an unconstitutional special law); Mayor of Balt. v. 
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tation.  None of Maryland’s sister states use their special laws prohibi-
tions in this novel way.  It is illogical to use Maryland’s provision to 
prevent discrimination because the identical legislative conduct—
impermissibly discriminatory classifications—will be subject to consti-
tutional restrictions under both the special laws provision and the 
equal protection concept, and consequently, subject to two different 
standards.79  Moreover, even the proponents of the most expansive 
interpretation of special laws provisions do not claim that they were 
drafted, or may be used, to prevent classifications that burden individ-
uals or groups.80
Despite these failings, the test developed in Cities Service is the 
controlling legal standard in Maryland.  It is this standard that will be 
used to test the effectiveness of the six previously identified theories 
of federal constitutional interpretation as applied to state constitu-
tions.  While the outcome of Cities Service—invalidating the mass mer-
chandiser exemption that applied only to Montgomery Ward—is gen-
erally viewed as correct,
  Quite simply, this mirror image rule, while rhetori-
cally attractive, is not supportable.  It is my view that Judge Eldridge’s 
opinion in Cities Service created an improper standard that is difficult 
to apply and improperly transformed what was a procedural legislative 
rule into what appears to be a substantive equality guaranty. 
81
 
United Rys. & Elec. Co., 126 Md. 39, 52, 94 A. 378, 382 (1915) (emphasizing the impor-
tance of preventing a highly influential individual from “getting an undue advantage over 
others”). 
 the appropriate question is whether the 
opinion formulated a useful and a correct standard for predicting and 
 79. Because impermissibly discriminatory classifications are subject to the equal pro-
tection notion implicit in the “laws of the land” provision of article 24, an attempt to use 
Maryland’s special laws provision to prevent discrimination would be subject to both the 
Cities Service test for the special laws complaint, see supra text accompanying notes 57–67, 
and a deferential rational basis review for the equal protection claim.  See Murphy v. Ed-
monds, 325 Md. 342, 355, 601 A.2d 102, 108 (1992) (noting that most provisions attacked 
on equal protection grounds are evaluated using a rational basis test). 
 80. See Donald Marritz, Making Equality Matter (Again): The Prohibition Against Special 
Laws in the Pennsylvania Constitution, 3 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 161, 194–96 (1993) (distinguish-
ing between the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment’s protections 
against classifications that burden and state special law provisions’ protections against clas-
sifications that benefit).  See also Tanner v. Or. Health Sci. Univ., 971 P.2d 435, 447–48 (Or. 
Ct. App. 1998) (using state equal privileges and immunities provision to remedy both favo-
ritism and discrimination); Timothy W. Snider, A Rational Basis Review Under Article I, Sec-
tion 20 of the Oregon Constitution?, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1215, 1223–25 (2003) (discussing 
how Tanner serves as an example in which “Oregon courts have interpreted the [state 
equal privileges and immunities clause] to forbid discrimination as well as favoritism”). 
 81. See, e.g., Green v. N.B.S., Inc., 409 Md. 528, 544–46, 976 A.2d 279, 288–89 (2009) 
(tracing the Cities Services rationale through subsequent citing cases) (citations omitted).  
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determining if other laws will violate the prohibition.82
IV.   APPLYING PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION TO STATE CONSTITUTIONS 
  As the prin-
ciples of constitutional interpretation will show, the court in Cities Ser-
vice failed to do so. 
Six theories of constitutional interpretation have come to domi-
nate the scholarly literature: (1) textualism, (2) originalism, (3) moral 
reasoning, (4) structural reasoning, (5) comparative constitutional 
law, and (6) common law reasoning.  This Part applies each of these 
theories of constitutional interpretation to the special laws provision 
of the Maryland Constitution to test their effectiveness in interpreting 
state constitutional provisions.  As you will see, in my view, none of 
these theories alone can properly provide interpretive solutions to all 
of the questions raised in interpreting the provision.   
A.  Textualist Analysis 
Textualism requires that constitutional interpretation begin with 
the text of the constitution.  There is no debate about this proposi-
tion.  Rather, the debate arises in considering whether, and with what 
external materials, the words of the text may be supplemented to de-
termine meaning.83  Some textualists take the position that the writ-
ten text is the only legitimate source for judicial action and that sup-
plementation is inherently antidemocratic.84  By contrast, other 
scholars argue that the judicial enterprise always involves interpreta-
tion.85  Dean John Hart Ely added another dimension to this debate 
by distinguishing between certain “specific” provisions of a constitu-
tion, which are amenable to a strict textual approach, and the more 
“open-textured” provisions, the interpretation of which require more 
judgment and reliance on external sources.86
 
 82. While courts must ultimately decide whether a law violates article III, section 33, 
my job is to predict and advise the Maryland General Assembly (the only body subject to 
the prohibition) on how to comply with the provision.  
  Finally, Professor Ahkil 
 83. See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1, 1–2 
(1984).  
 84. MICHAEL J. GERHARDT ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: ARGUMENTS AND 
PERSPECTIVES 175 (3d ed. 2007) [hereinafter GERHARDT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY]. 
 85. See, e.g., Richard Posner, What Am I?  A Plotted Plant?  The Case Against Strict Construc-
tionism, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 28, 1987, at 23–25, reprinted in GERHARDT, CONSTITUTIONAL 
THEORY 191–93 (arguing that, because the Constitution is written in general terms, any 
application of the Constitution by a judge must involve at least some interpretation).  
 86. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 12–13 
(1980).  
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Reed Amar reminds us to pay attention to the use of similar words 
throughout the constitution to aid in our understanding of their re-
spective meanings.87
State constitutional interpretation frequently takes a decidedly 
textualist tone.
 
88  In cases in which there are analog provisions of the 
federal constitution, interpreters of state constitutions have frequently 
used even minor textual differences as a starting point for indepen-
dent interpretation.89  Even in cases in which there is not a cognate 
federal provision, state constitutional interpretation tends to focus on 
the constitutional text and, specifically, a single “clause-bound” piece 
of text.90
Textualist analysis of the Maryland special laws provision begins, 
of course, with the text itself: “And the General Assembly shall pass no 
special Law, for any case, for which provision has been made, by an 
existing General Law.”
 
91  The most important questions for a textual-
ist analysis then, are what are “special laws” and what are “general 
laws.”  Unfortunately, it is difficult to know the exact meaning of ei-
ther term.  When these types of provisions came to popularity in state 
constitutions beginning in about the 1850s, there was no body of law 
that defined what exactly constituted a special law and what consti-
tuted a general law.92
 
 87. Ahkil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 748 (1999). 
  According to Professor Thomas F. Green, Jr., at 
the time of the adoption of these constitutional provisions, “the exis-
 88. G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 194 (1998) [hereinafter 
TARR, UNDERSTANDING]. 
 89. See, e.g., Hansen v. Owens, 619 P.2d 315, 316–17 (Utah 1980) (finding broader pri-
vilege in article I, section 12, of the Utah Constitution, which provides that “[t]he accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself,” than in the Fifth Amendment of 
the U.S. Constitution, which provides that no person can be compelled “to be a witness 
against himself”) (emphasis added), overruled by American Fork City v. Crosgrove, 701 P.2d 
1069, 1075 (Utah 1985).  See also People v. Bullock, 485 N.W.2d 866, 872 n.11 (Mich. 1992) 
(“[I]t seems self-evident that that any adjectival phrase in the form ‘A or B’ necessarily en-
compasses a broader sweep than a phrase in the form ‘A and B.’  The set of punishments 
which are either ‘cruel’ or ‘unusual’ would seem necessarily broader than the set of pu-
nishments which are both ‘cruel’ and ‘unusual.’”).  
 90. See TARR, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 88, at 194 (suggesting that because state 
constitutions have been frequently amended, constitutional theorists cannot often look to 
the whole document to “illuminate the meaning of its parts,” and that state constitutions 
require a “clause-bound” interpretation, which limits the analysis to a portion of the con-
stitution); WILLIAMS, STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 30, at 338–39 (discussing the evo-
lution of state constitutional language over time). 
 91. MD. CONST. art. III, § 33. 
 92. Thomas F. Green, Jr., A Malapropian Provision of State Constitutions, 24 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 359, 368 n.39 (1939) (“Prior to the adoption of the constitutional provisions, the 
phrases ‘special act’ and ‘local act’ had no legal significance.”).  
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tence of the mischief was recognized, but the exact nature of the evil 
had not been defined.”93
Maryland law suggests that, particularly in interpreting the con-
stitution, which reflects the voice of the people, we should begin with 
the ordinary meaning that would be given to the words.
 
94  The prob-
lem is not that “special” and “general” are technical terms, but rather 
that they are exceedingly common words used in a technical sense.  
Therefore, neither the dictionary definitions of “special” and “gener-
al” from 1864,95 nor from the modern era,96
 
 93. Id. at 368.  
 provide any useful guid-
ance.  Even if we are permitted to use legal dictionaries of the times, 
 94. Older Maryland cases took the position that interpreting the state constitution and 
ordinary statutes were different tasks.  As the Court of Appeals said in Picking v. State:  
[T]he rules for construing a statute are not the same as those by which the 
courts are bound when they come to interpret the meaning of a constitutional 
provision.  The technical rules applicable to the former have no application to 
the latter.  “The Constitution, unlike the Acts of our Legislature, owes its whole 
force and authority to its ratification by the people, and they judged of it by the 
meaning apparent upon its face, according to the general use of the words em-
ployed, where they do not appear to have been used in a legal or technical 
sense.[”] 
26 Md. 499, 504–05 (1867) (quoting Manly v. State, 7 Md. 135, 147 (1854)).  See WILLIAMS, 
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 30, at 315–16 (quoting Vreeland v. Byrne, 370 A.2d 825, 
830 (N.J. 1977)) (describing state constitutional interpretive preference for ordinary or 
plain-meaning interpretations as consistent with the “voice of the people”).  Modern Mary-
land cases uniformly reject the idea of a distinction between the techniques of interpreta-
tion of statutes and constitutions, see, e.g., Andrews v. Governor, 294 Md. 285, 290, 449 
A.2d 1144, 1147 (1982) (“In ascertaining the meaning of a constitutional provision, we are 
governed by the same rules of interpretation which prevail in relation to a statute.”) (cita-
tion omitted), but continue to hold that the words of the Maryland Constitution should be 
given the plain-meaning interpretation that the people would have understood when it 
was ratified. See, e.g., Abrams v. Lamone, 398 Md. 146, 172, 919 A.2d 1223, 1239 (2007) (ci-
tations omitted) (applying the general Maryland rule that constitutional provisions should 
be interpreted by the plain meaning at the time they were adopted).  While it is possible, 
maybe even likely, that this apparent inconsistency can be reconciled, Maryland’s cases 
have not yet done so. 
 95. The terms “special and general” were incorporated into the Maryland Constitution 
in 1864.  See Gans v. Carter, 77 Md. 1, 8–9, 25 A. 663, 663–64 (1893) (discussing the adop-
tion of article III, section 33 during the 1864 Maryland Constitutional Convention).  Noah 
Webster’s 1859 dictionary, a popular dictionary in 1864, included this definition: “Special 
statute is a private act of the legislature such as respects a private person or individual.”  
NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1060 (1859).  Web-
ster’s definition of “general” includes no reference to “general statutes.”  Id. at 487.   
 96. See, e.g., THE AMERICAN NEW HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
1729 (3d ed. 1992) (defining “special” as “having a limited or specific function,” however, 
there is no definition of “special law”); id. at 755 (defining “general” as “concerned with, 
applicable to, or affecting the whole or every member of a class or category,” however, 
there is no definition of “general law”). 
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they provide little guidance.97  It is only modern legal dictionaries, 
usually off-limits to textualists interpreting popularly adopted consti-
tutions,98 that provide useful definitions.99
Part of the problem arises from the partial importation of Eng-
lish practice.  From medieval times, in part because of the inability of 
the courts to provide appropriate redress, private bills made up a sig-
nificant part of Parliament’s legislative output.
 
100  These private bills 
granted favor, legal relief, and redress of private wrongs, often in cir-
cumstances in which relief was not available from the courts.101
 
 97. John Bouvier’s Law Dictionary in 1843 and 1864 did not have definitions of either 
general or special law.  His 1885 edition, however, defines general law, and by reference to 
the definition of general law, special law is defined.  Unfortunately, however, even if it 
could be made relevant, the definition provides little guidance for the modern interpreter:  
  Black-
GENERAL LAWS.  The later constitutions of many of the states place restrictions 
upon the legislature to pass special laws in certain cases.  In some states there is a 
provision that general laws only may be passed, in cases where such can be made 
applicable.  Under these provisions the legislature has discretion to determine 
the cases in which a special law may be passed . . . .  The wisdom of these consti-
tutional provisions has been the subject of grave doubt.   
1 JOHN BOUVIER, LAW DICTIONARY 707 (Philidelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1885) (cita-
tions omitted). 
 98. See Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the Word: Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme Court, 30 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 275, 312 (1998) (suggesting that legal dictionaries, which draw their defini-
tions from legal opinions, are particularly poor choices for textualist interpretations).  
 99. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990): 
General law.  A law that affects the community at large.  A general law as contra-
distinguished from one that is special or local, is a law that embraces a class of 
subjects or places, and does not omit any subject or place naturally belonging to 
such class.  A law, framed in general terms, restricted to no locality, and operat-
ing equally upon all of a group of objects, which, having regard to the purposes 
of the legislation, are distinguished by characteristics sufficiently marked and 
important to make them a class by themselves, is not a special or local law, but a 
general law.  A law that relates to a subject of a general nature, or that affects all 
people of state, or all of a particular class.  
Id. at 684. 
Special law. One relating to particular persons or things; one made for individual 
cases or for particular places or districts; one operating upon a selected class, ra-
ther than upon the public generally.  A private law.  A law is “special” when it is 
different from others of the same general kind or designed for a particular pur-
pose, or limited in range or confined to a prescribed field of action or operation.  
A “special law” relates to either particular persons, places, or things or to per-
sons, places, or things which, though not particularized, are separated by any 
method of selection from the whole class to which the law might, but not such 
legislation, be applied.  A special law applies only to an individual or a number of 
individuals out of a single class similarly situated and affected, or to a special lo-
cality. 
Id. at 1397–98 (citations omitted). 
 100. ROBERT LUCE, LEGISLATIVE PROBLEMS 536–37 (1935). 
 101. Id. 
 2012] STATE CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 431 
stone described a “general or public act” as “a universal rule that re-
gards the whole country[,]” while “special or private acts are rather 
exceptions than rules, being those which only operate upon particu-
lar persons and private concerns.”102  English practice since Black-
stone’s time, however, has used the term “public” rather than “gener-
al,” and “private” rather than “special.”103  All English legislation re-
requires the King’s consent, but his approval of public bills was given 
by the phrase “Le roy le veut,”104 while for private bills, he replied, “Soit 
fait comme il est desirè.”105  Public and private acts appeared in the sta-
tute books together until 1798, but since then only public acts are set 
out in full.106  The distinction between public and private acts carries 
legal significance in the English system because the courts are re-
quired to take judicial cognizance of public acts but not of private 
acts, unless private acts are formally set forth in the pleadings.107
In the American practice, however, there was no legal distinction 
between public and private bills, which were approved in the same 
manner and often, although not exclusively, codified together.
 
108  
Moreover, because of the longstanding practice of enacting private 
laws in both England and the United States, it was widely assumed 
that private or special legislation was necessary to the operation of 
government.109  Despite this belief, during the middle part of the ni-
neteenth century the amount of special legislation adopted by state 
legislatures exploded and ultimately became a real impediment to the 
flow of legislative business.110
 
 102. Id. at 532 (quoting 13 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *85–86). 
  When state constitutional conventions 
 103. See 13 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *85 (referring to two types of laws as  
“general or special, public or private”).  The United States Congress has adopted the Eng-
lish terms; state constitutions usually use the terms special and general.  LUCE, supra note 
100, at 534–35.  But see Lyman H. Cloe & Sumner Marcus, Special and Local Legislation, 24 
KY. L.J. 351, 362 (1936) (describing variations and inconsistency in use of terms in state 
constitutions). 
 104. “Le roy le veult” means “The King wills it so to be.”  BLACKSTONE, supra note 103, 
at *184. 
 105. “Be it as it is desired.”  Id.  See also LUCE, supra note 100, at 538. 
 106. LUCE, supra note 100, at 538. 
 107. Id.; see Cloe & Marcus, supra note 103, at 363 & n.51 (noting the use of “special” 
and “general” to distinguish those statutes which the English Courts would not recognize 
from those that did not require special pleadings).  
 108. Cf. LUCE, supra note 100, at 538–39 (“In the assemblies of colonial America no 
sharp line was drawn between public and private bills.  They were printed indiscriminately 
in the statute book, and indeed it was not uncommon for part of a statue to be general and 
part special.”). 
 109. Green, supra note 92 at 368. 
 110. See LUCE, supra note 100, at 544–45 (describing the explosion of the introduction 
of private bills); Cloe & Marcus, supra note 103, at 355–56 (characterizing special laws as 
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began to propose prohibitions on special laws, there was a general 
understanding of the problem but no accepted definition of what 
constituted a special law.111  Courts and commentators have struggled 
mightily to create appropriate definitions.112  Professor Green fore-
went a definition and, much like Judge Eldridge in Cities Service, pro-
posed a purely functional test, stating that a law is special “when its 
operation and effect are such as to contribute to the evils which the 
constitution seeks to remove.”113  On the other hand, a law is general 
in nature “when it does not exclude cases which are substantially simi-
lar to those included in its operation, when it makes no unjust distinc-
tions and confers no special favors, and when able and honest men 
will recognize that the differentiation is justified and therefore time, 
attention, and money are not wasted.”114  Nevertheless, even applying 
Professor Green’s functional test, it may be true that the only real de-
finition of a special law is one that “the court calls Special.”115
Thus, a textualist is likely to be frustrated in attempting to interp-
ret Maryland’s special laws provision as the key terms were not de-
fined at the time of adoption.  Nor are the key terms clearly unders-
tood today.  At the risk of adding more insult to textualist injury, it is 
necessary to point out that textualism also cannot answer any of the 
other questions about the special laws provision, including: is the pro-
vision mandatory (and enforceable by the courts) or is it directory (and 
subject to legislative discretion)?;
 
116 what is the meaning of the clause 
“for any case”?;117
 
an “almost universally obnoxious” form of legislation); Green, supra note 
 and, what are we supposed to do with the extra 
92, at 362–64, 
(criticizing special laws as “trivial matters” whose explosion increased political corruption 
and “undue enlargement” of statute books); Robert M. Ireland, The Problem of Local, Pri-
vate, and Special Legislation in the Nineteenth Century United States, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 271, 
275–77 (2004) (characterizing the process of special legislation as “basically undemocrat-
ic” and the recipient of too much legislative attention). 
 111. Green, supra note 92, at 362–64, 368. 
 112. For a confusing discussion of the confusion, see Cloe & Marcus, supra note 107, at 
365 (“If ‘private’ constitutes a further subdivision it would seem that ‘local’ and ‘special’ 
would include only those laws where there was an unreasonable classification and not 
those in which there was no attempt to classify, the objects being specified by name, which 
would be ‘private.’”). 
 113. Green, supra note 92, at 366. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Frank E. Horack, Special Legislation: Another Twilight Zone, 12 IND. L.J. 109, 123 
(1936).  
 116. See infra text accompanying note 217.  
 117. My theory is that this clause actually means to limit the applicability of the special 
laws prohibition to legislation that would affect actual pending litigation.  See infra text ac-
companying notes 171–173. 
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commas?118
Professor Amar’s intertextualist method, in which an interpreter 
“tries to read a word or phrase that appears in the Constitution in 
light of another passage in the Constitution featuring the same (or a 
very similar) word or phrase,”
  These shortcomings demonstrate that textualism alone 
cannot provide the meaning of the special laws prohibition.  Moreo-
ver, they are illustrative of the problem of limiting interpretation to 
the words of the text. 
119 also offers us little assistance in de-
termining the meaning of the key phrases in the special laws prohibi-
tion, except to emphasize the close connections between the three 
sentences of article III, section 33.120  The term “special Law” does not 
appear anywhere in the Maryland Constitution except in the first and 
second sentences of article III, section 33, and the term “General 
Law” appears only in the second and third sentences of the provi-
sion.121
B.  Originalist Analysis 
 
Originalism is an interpretive system that compels its adherents 
to apply the original public meaning of the provisions of the Constitu-
tion to even the most modern of constitutional questions.122
 
 118. In a prior article, I noted that the drafters of the Maryland Declaration of Rights in 
1776 were “overly fond of commas.”  Dan Friedman, Tracing the Lineage: Textual and Concep-
tual Similarities in the Revolutionary-Era State Declarations of Rights of Virginia, Maryland, and 
Delaware, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 929, 950 (2002).  Apparently, our constitutional framers had not 
outgrown that fondness by 1864.  We could safely remove all three: “And the General As-
sembly shall pass no special Law, for any case, for which provision has been made, by an 
existing General Law.”  MD. CONST. art. III, § 33.  A case could be made that “for any case” 
is an appositive phrase that can be set off by commas, but there is no possible grammatical 
justification for that last comma. 
  Original-
 119. Amar, supra note 87, at 748.  See also DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, 
JUDGMENT CALLS 28 (2009) [hereinafter FARBER & SHERRY, JUDGMENT CALLS] (defining 
“intratextualism” as a “variant form of textualism” that calls for the interpreter “to com-
pare different parts of the constitutional text in the search for meaning”). 
 120. See MD. CONST. art. III, § 33. 
 121. Id.  For the full text of section 33, see supra note 44. 
 122. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF 
THE LAW 143–45 (1990) (noting that in originalist theory, “[a]ll that counts is how the 
words used in the Constitution would have been understood at the time”). It is important 
to distinguish originalism from ordinary historical research.  Constitutional interpretation 
has always been informed by historical research. Madison’s notes of the debates of the fed-
eral Constitutional Convention of 1789, for example, frequently help us understand what 
was intended by a provision.  Originalism, however, is different in that historical research 
ceases to be an interpreter’s tool and becomes the sole, definitive source of answers in de-
termining meaning.  See generally id. at 218–19 (arguing that originalists seek the objective 
meaning of the language when it was adopted, and that a change in circumstances or situ-
ations “does not mean that we should conclude that those terms can be redefined to say 
absolutely anything we like”). 
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ism arises from concerns over the so-called “countermajoritarian diffi-
culty,” the seeming paradox that in a democratic society, unelected 
judges are permitted to overrule democratically adopted legislation 
based on what might be their idiosyncratic ideas of what the Constitu-
tion requires.123  According to the originalists, judicial review can only 
be justified if judges are constrained to view the Constitution accord-
ing to the common public understanding of a provision at the time of 
its adoption.124  In many ways, originalism developed in reaction to 
what its founders and adherents—including Robert Bork, Edwin 
Meese, and Antonin Scalia125—saw as unprincipled constitutional de-
cisions like Griswold v. Connecticut and Roe v. Wade.  Critics dispute 
every step of the originalist analysis, arguing that there is no counter-
majoritarian difficulty126 or that it is significantly overstated;127 that the 
range of potential interpretations is effectively constrained by other 
means;128
 
 123. Friedman, Countermajoritarian Difficulty, supra note 
 that the constitutional Framers themselves did not intend 
11, at 1385. 
 124. See Edwin Meese, III, Toward a Jurisprudence of Original Intent, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 5, 10–11 (1988) [hereinafter Meese, Toward a Jurisprudence] (arguing that judicial 
action becomes problematic when the courts do not feel bound by the text or original 
meaning of the Constitution). 
 125. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 122, at 110–15 (criticizing the Court’s reasoning in Gris-
wold v. Connecticut and Roe v. Wade as a departure from constitutional text); Robert H. 
Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 8–9 (1971) (ar-
guing that Griswold v. Connecticut “is an unprincipled decision” that “fails every test of neu-
trality”); Meese, Toward a Jurisprudence, supra note 124, at 10–11 (criticizing judges who are 
“tempted to add to or subtract from the written constitution” as contrary to the intentions 
of the Framers); Edwin Meese, III, The Supreme Court of the United States: Bulwark of a Limited 
Constitution, 27 S. TEX. L.J. 455, 464–65 (1986) (arguing that a jurisprudence of original 
intention would prevent judicial decisions that are “mere policy choices instead of articula-
tions of constitutional principle”); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 849, 864 (1989) (arguing that originalism establishes a historical criterion that can 
tame the “inevitable tendency of judges to think that the law is what they would like it to 
be”). 
 126. See, e.g., Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Ju-
diciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35, 36–37 (1993) (arguing because very few judicial decisions 
present instances of countermajoritarian difficulty it is not the appropriate lens through 
which to view the judiciary). 
 127. See, e.g., FARBER & SHERRY, JUDGMENT CALLS, supra note 119, at 23–26 (arguing that 
the three premises providing the foundation for the countermajoritarian dilemma are 
each “either false or greatly exaggerated”); FARBER & SHERRY, SEEKING CERTAINTY, supra 
note 4, at 145 (arguing that “[a]lthough the countermajoritarian difficulty has a core of 
truth, it has been blown out of proportion”). 
 128. See, e.g., FARBER & SHERRY, JUDGMENT CALLS, supra note 119, at 6 (arguing that 
judicial discretion is effectively restrained by adherence to precedent, process constraints, 
and internalized norms); FARBER & SHERRY, SEEKING CERTAINTY, supra note 4, at 13–14 
(contending that the originalist view of the Constitution as “a simple recipe” with “clear 
directions” from history “fall[s] prey to the fallacy that there is no middle ground between 
blind adherence to originalism and purely political decisionmaking”). 
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for their views to control, but instead drafted the Constitution to allow 
development,129 that it is impossible to determine with certainty (and 
at appropriate levels of generalization) the original public under-
standing,130 or that it is even appropriate to allow the “dead hand” of 
our Revolutionary-Era forefathers to govern our current affairs.131  Fi-
nally, and most importantly, originalism’s critics charge that it is iron-
ically ineffective in constraining judicial activism.132
Many of the theoretical underpinnings that underlie originalism 
do not exist or exist only in modified form in state constitutions.  For 
example, a major reason that originalists seek to constrain the inter-
pretative range of federal judges is that they are not democratically 
elected; yet many state judges are.
 
133  Similarly, one important reason 
for originalists to constrain judges is the near impossibility of amend-
ing the federal constitution to correct interpretations offensive to a 
democratic majority.134  It is not nearly so difficult to amend state con-
stitutions, and they are frequently amended specifically to correct in-
dividual case interpretations.135
 
 129. See Charles A. Lofgren, The Original Understanding of Original Intent?, 5 CONST. 
COMMENT. 77, 84–85 (1988) (arguing that although “[t]he framers assuredly gave [the 
Constitution] its words they did not determine the meaning of those words as understood 
by the ratifiers”); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. 
L. REV. 885, 887–88 (1985) (noting that the original “original intent” referred to the pro-
ceedings of state ratifying conventions rather than to the intent of the Framers). 
  Thus, it is not clear that originalism—
 130. See Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 1085, 1095 (1989) (discussing the difficulties of determining the appropriate level of 
generality in interpreting constitutional principles). 
 131. See id. at 1095–97 (acknowledging that one of the most common arguments against 
originalism is that it is “too static”). 
 132. See FARBER & SHERRY, SEEKING CERTAINTY, supra note 4, at 155 (noting that even 
originalism is not “sufficiently determinate to stop willful judges from pursuing their own 
preferences”). 
 133. See Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 
62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 757–58 (1995) (discussing the accountability problems that ac-
company an unelected judiciary).  In Maryland, our appellate judges are subject to reten-
tion election every ten years.  MD. CONST. art. IV, § 5A(c), (d). 
 134. See TARR, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 88, at 23–24 (noting that while the federal 
constitution has been amended less than once per decade, 5,900 amendments out of 9,500 
proposed ones have been adopted by the states as of 1996). 
 135. See WILLIAMS, STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 30, at 335 (noting that provisions 
can be included in state constitutions to effectively overrule a judicial interpretation). An 
example from Maryland is the 1978 constitutional amendment to art. III, § 52(11) and 
(12), Acts of 1978, ch. 971 (ratified Nov. 7, 1978), which was adopted to reverse the out-
come of Md. Action for Foster Children, Inc. v. State, 279 Md. 133, 367 A.2d 491 (1977) and to 
restore the intended constitutional balance in budget-making between the legislative and 
executive departments.  See Dan Friedman, Magnificent Failure Revisited: Modern Maryland 
Constitutional Law from 1967 to 1998, 58 MD. L. REV. 528, 557–58 (1999) (discussing the 
General Assembly’s response to the Court of Appeals’ decision in Maryland Action for Foster 
Children). 
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at least in its most distilled foundationalist form—can be imported in-
to state constitutional interpretation.  
1. Uncovering the Original Public Meaning of the Special Laws 
Provision 
Despite these theoretical limitations, what can an originalist anal-
ysis add to the understanding of Maryland’s prohibition on special 
laws?  Originalist theorists tell us that the most important clue to the 
meaning of a constitutional provision is what the ratifiers (not the 
drafters) intended.136  Unfortunately, however, we will never know 
what the citizens of Maryland thought of this provision during the ra-
tification vote.  Unlike the state conventions that ratified the federal 
constitution, whose debates were recorded and can provide clues 
about the ratifiers’ intent, state constitutions—at least by the mid-
nineteenth century—were ratified directly by the voters.137  No 
speeches are made or recorded in the process of citizen voting.  All 
that can be known directly is the final vote tally,138 which tells nothing 
about the ratifiers’ intent with respect to a single provision.139
The lack of secondary materials is not surprising.  Political cam-
paigns, including constitutional ratification campaigns, tend to focus 
on a few large issues and not the minutia for which we are searching.  
This was especially true in the ratification campaign for the Maryland 
Constitution of 1864, which was debated largely as a referendum on 
  Some-
times there can be indirect evidence, such as newspaper articles, de-
scribing or even advocating for certain constitutional provisions.  
With respect to Maryland’s special laws provision, however, there is no 
such indirect evidence.  Despite extensive research, I can find no 
newspaper accounts or other indirect sources from the ratification 
campaign that discussed this provision. 
 
 136. See WILLIAMS, STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 30, at 320–21 (discussing theories 
of “linkage” between intent of drafters and ratifiers of state constitutions). 
 137. Id. at 26. 
 138. This strikes me as an important defect in originalism as a theory.  Originalist theor-
ists have identified ratifiers’ intent as the critical piece of evidence, but ratifiers’ intent is 
evidence that can exist only in the unique historical circumstances of the ratification of the 
federal constitution by state ratifying conventions. If this is true, originalism, at least in its 
most distilled form, can have little appeal as a general theory outside of its application to 
the federal constitution. 
 139. The vote to adopt the Maryland Constitution of 1864 was very close—27,541 Mary-
land voters supported the constitution, and 29,536 opposed it.  Only the absentee ballots 
cast by soldiers in the field saved the constitution.  Not surprisingly, the Union soldiers 
voted overwhelmingly for the new constitution: 2,633 for and only 263 against, and thus 
provided the razor-thin margin of victory.  JEAN H. BAKER, THE POLITICS OF CONTINUITY: 
MARYLAND POLITICAL PARTIES FROM 1858 TO 1870, at 109 n.120 (1973). 
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the ongoing Civil War.140  Thus, important innovations in the 1864 
Constitution were (1) a provision providing immediate emancipation 
of Maryland slaves;141 (2) a provision declaring that “paramount alle-
giance” is owed to the federal government and Constitution;142 and 
(3) a series of restrictive loyalty oaths designed to disenfranchise Con-
federate sympathizers and ensure the continued electoral success of 
the controlling Unionist party.143  If there was a fourth topic that 
could have garnered public attention, it would have been the radical 
restructuring and centralization of the state public education sys-
tem.144
 
 140. See BAKER, supra note 
  There is no recorded evidence that anybody outside of the 
139, at 108–09 (“Inevitably the campaign for ratification of 
the Constitution merged with that to elect Lincoln and the Unionist candidate for gover-
nor, Thomas Swann.  This campaign played on expressive symbols long familiar to Mary-
landers—the importance of Union, the necessity of allegiance to the United States, and 
the need for a new Constitution. . . .  Support of Unionism and the Constitution assured 
progress . . . .  Opposition to Unionism meant support for the slave oligarchy of the past—
and the secessionists of the present.”). 
 141. MD. CONST. (1864), Decl. of Rts., art. 24 (“That hereafter, in this State, there shall 
be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except in punishment of crime, whereof the 
party shall have been duly convicted; and all persons held to service or labor as slaves are 
hereby declared free.”); see also WILLIAM STARR MYERS, The Maryland Constitution of 1864, 
JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV. STUDIES, Series XIX, Nos. 8–9, 52–59 (1901) (highlighting the de-
bates and arguments that took place when the provision was adopted). 
 142. MD. CONST. (1864), Decl. of Rts., art. 5 (“The Constitution of the United States, 
and the laws made in pursuance thereof being the supreme law of the land, every citizen 
of this State owes paramount allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the Unit-
ed States, and is not bound by any law or ordinance of this State in contravention or sub-
version thereof.”).  For a brief discussion of the importance of this “paramount allegiance” 
provision in 1864, see THOMAS SCHARF, HISTORY OF MARYLAND FROM THE EARLIEST 
PERIOD TO THE PRESENT DAY 582 (1967); Dan Friedman, The History, Development, and In-
terpretation of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 637, 687 n.173–74 (1998); 
MYERS, supra note 141, at 59–60.  
 143. MD. CONST. (1864), art. I, §§ 4, 7; art. III, § 47; DAN FRIEDMAN, THE MARYLAND 
STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 7 (2006) [hereinafter FRIEDMAN, STATE 
CONSTITUTION].  The Maryland Constitution of 1864 was short-lived. By 1867, Maryland 
had adopted a new constitution whose drafters were committed to eliminating the innova-
tions made in the 1864 constitution.  In fact, the 1867 Constitutional Convention seriously 
considered a proposal to use the 1851 Maryland Constitution as a guide for its delibera-
tions, effectively ignoring the intervening 1864 Maryland Constitution. PHILIP B. PERLMAN, 
DEBATES OF THE MARYLAND CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1867, at 53–54, 57–58 
(1923).  Although this procedure was ultimately rejected, the delegates to the 1867 Consti-
tutional Convention clearly understood that a large part of their task was to repeal por-
tions of the 1864 Constitution.  See Friedman, supra note 135, at 538 n.55 (noting that be-
cause the Maryland Constitution of 1864 “did not appropriately reflect the political views 
of the Maryland electorate, it was replaced at the earliest possible opportunity, 1867”).  
Despite their goal of restoring the pre-Civil War status quo ante, and despite their success in 
many instances doing so, the drafters of the 1867 Maryland Constitution did not remove 
what is now article III, section 33.  See infra notes 255–262 and accompanying text. 
 144. See MD. CONST. (1864), art. VIII (governing the education system in Maryland, in-
cluding but not limited to the creation of a centralized education system, its funding, and 
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constitutional convention considered or even cared about the special 
laws provision. 
In lieu of evidence of the ratifiers’ intent, an originalist interpre-
ter of article III, section 33 is left only with the drafters’ intent.145  For-
tunately, that record tells an interesting story.  But, reading the de-
bates of the constitutional convention of 1864 suggests that at least 
the first two sentences of article III, section 33 must be read togeth-
er.146  Otherwise, there is almost no history of the second sentence—
the one about which we care—to review.  Delegate Ezekiel Forman 
Chambers147
 
the powers and rights of the General Assembly with respect to education in Maryland); see 
also Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 622–23, 458 A.2d 758, 771 
(1983) (detailing how article VIII of the Maryland Constitution of 1864 restructured the 
educational system); MYERS, supra note 
 introduced an amendment that added what is now 
141, at 85–86 (describing the importance and the 
working details of a new article governing the Maryland system of education); L.E. Blauch, 
The First Uniform School System of Maryland, 1865–1868, 26 MD. HIST. MAG. 205, 205 (1931) 
(noting that the 1864 Maryland Constitution “was the first legal enactment for a uniform 
system of public schools in Maryland”); Susan P. Leviton & Matthew H. Joseph, An Ade-
quate Education for All Maryland’s Children: Morally Right, Economically Necessary, and Constitu-
tionally Required, 52 MD. L. REV. 1137, 1155 (1993) (noting the 1864 education clause 
called for a “uniform system of free public schools” and contained a specific requirement 
to hire a state superintendent of schools who would have been granted wide authority to 
improve the State’s educational quality). 
 145. See WILLIAMS, STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 135, at 320–21 (noting that be-
cause it is only with the consent of the drafters that constitutional provisions are submitted 
to the ratifiers, intent of the drafters may be relevant); Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus—
Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 GA. L. REV. 165, 197 (1984) (“State constitu-
tions . . . have drafters, yes, but no ‘Founders’ . . . .”). 
 146. The first two sentences of article III, section 33 of the Maryland Constitution pro-
vide: 
The General Assembly shall not pass local, or special Laws, in any of the follow-
ing enumerated cases, viz.: For extending the time for the collection of taxes; 
granting divorces; changing the name of any person; providing for the sale of 
real estate, belonging to minors, or other persons laboring under legal disabili-
ties, by executors, administrators, guardians or trustees; giving effect to informal, 
or invalid deeds or wills; refunding money paid into the State Treasury, or releas-
ing persons from their debts, or obligations to the State, unless recommended by 
the Governor, or officers of the Treasury Department.  And the General Assem-
bly shall pass no special Law, for any case, for which provision has been made, by 
an existing General Law. 
MD. CONST. art. III, § 33; see Oscar Leser, Report on the Evils of Special and Local Legislation, in 
REPORT OF THE EIGHTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE MARYLAND STATE BAR ASSOCIATION 160, 
177–78 (1904) (noting that the second sentence extended the prohibition of the General 
Assembly to pass special laws to any cases, in addition to the ones enumerated in the first 
sentence, for which provisions had been made by an existing law).   
 147. Ezekiel Forman Chambers was at the twilight of an extraordinarily distinguished 
career when he was elected as a delegate from Kent County to the Constitutional Conven-
tion of 1864, having previously served as a Brigadier General in the War of 1812; a state 
senator (1822-1826); a United States senator (1826-1834); judge of the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland (1834-1851); and a delegate to the Maryland Constitutional Convention of 1851.  
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known as the second sentence of article III, section 33.  The provision 
was adopted without debate or even a recorded vote.148
Widening the lens, however, and reading the history of the first 
two sentences of article III, section 33 together, much more informa-
tion can be gathered.  When the convention began to consider the 
proposed article III, on July 19, 1864, Delegate Henry Stockbridge of 
Baltimore City
  That’s it. 
149 introduced a new provision, explicitly modeled on a 
provision of the Indiana Constitution150
 
Just three weeks after the new Constitution of 1864 was approved by the voters, Judge 
Chambers, the Democratic candidate, was defeated in his campaign for Governor of Mary-
land.  BIOGRAPHICAL CYCLOPEDIA OF REPRESENTATIVE MEN OF MARYLAND AND DISTRICT OF 
COLUMBIA 97-98 (Baltimore 1879) [hereinafter BIOGRAPHICAL CYCLOPEDIA]; Biographical 
Directory of the United States Congress, 
 that would prohibit “local or 
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodis-
play.pl?index=C000282 (last visited Feb. 13, 2012). 
 148. Delegate Ezekiel Forman Chambers of Kent County proposed the language that 
became the second sentence of article III, section 33 three times at the Maryland Constitu-
tional Convention of 1864.  First, Delegate Chambers suggested a provision requesting that 
“[t]he legislature shall not pass any special law to make valid a defective deed, or afford 
other remedy in any case for which under existing laws provision has been made.”  2 THE 
DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF MARYLAND 882 (Anna-
polis, Richard P. Bayly 1864) [hereinafter 2 DEBATES].  The amendment was ruled out of 
order.  Id.  Chambers proposed it again and it was again ruled out of order.  Id. at 885–86.  
In commenting on another proposal, Chambers remarked that: “If the proposition . . . 
should be rejected, then I would submit my proposition, which is simply, that there shall 
be no special legislation in any case in which the provisions of the general law enables the 
party to obtain redress.”  Id. at 887.  And, a short while later, Delegate Chambers urged the 
body to vote against another proposition the convention was considering in favor of a now 
streamlined proposal that Chambers wished to offer: “The legislature shall pass no special 
law in any case in which under existing law provision is made.”  Id.  None of his colleagues 
even responded.  Finally, on Saturday, July 23, 1864, Delegate Chambers was allowed to 
offer his amendment and it was adopted without debate or a recorded vote.  Id. at 896–97; 
see also PROCEEDINGS OF THE STATE CONVENTION OF MARYLAND TO FRAME A NEW 
CONSTITUTION 297 (Annapolis, Richard P. Bayly 1864) (describing Delegate Chambers’ 
amendment).   
 149. Delegate Stockbridge was a lawyer and a member of the State Senate at the time of 
his election as a delegate to the Constitutional Convention of 1864.  Delegate Stockbridge 
served as Chairman of the Judiciary Committee and was a leader of the Republi-
can/Unionist Party at the convention.  BIOGRAPHICAL CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 147, at 189–
90; see also 2 MEN OF MARK IN MARYLAND 299 (1912) (biography of Judge Henry Stock-
bridge, Jr., son of Delegate Henry Stockbridge). 
 150. See 2 DEBATES, supra note 148, at 877 (statement of Delegate Stockbridge) (stating 
that there are similar provisions in other state constitutions and that, “[p]erhaps the most 
full and ample is that in the constitution of Indiana, on page 352 of the book of constitu-
tions”).  Delegate Stockbridge was describing a book purchased by the 1864 Constitutional 
Convention that was referred to as “American Constitutions” and published by “Lippincott 
in Philadelphia.”  1 DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF 
MARYLAND 36–37 (Annapolis, Richard P. Bayly 1864).  The book is formally titled THE 
AMERICAN’S GUIDE: COMPRISING THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE; THE ARTICLES OF 
CONFEDERATION; THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, AND THE CONSTITUTIONS OF 
THE SEVERAL STATES COMPOSING THE UNION (1864) [hereinafter THE AMERICAN’S GUIDE].  
The Archives of Maryland has published online a copy of this volume “known to have been 
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special laws” in thirteen enumerated cases.151  Although he mashed 
them together considerably both in the written amendment and in 
his comments,152 he was clearly concerned with two separate prob-
lems: local bills, which he thought should be handled by local gov-
ernment; and special laws, which he thought were in the “nature and 
form of a litigated case” and should be adjudicated by courts and not 
the legislature.153  Thus, Delegate Stockbridge—the proponent of the 
amendment—saw the principal purpose of the prohibition on special 
laws as reinforcing the separation of powers.154  Delegate Stockbridge 
also saw his amendment primarily protecting the legislature from the 
demands of citizens, not as protecting citizens from the legislature.155
The comments of Delegate Chambers make clear that he too 
viewed Delegate Stockbridge’s amendment as protecting the separa-
tion of powers.  Delegate Chambers focused on whether the courts or 
the legislature is the proper venue for certain disputes to be resolved: 
“There is no mischief in this State greater than that which has been 
   
 
used by W. R. Cole, Secretary, Constitutional Convention of 1864.”  420 ARCHIVES OF 
MARYLAND ONLINE (Sept. 27, 2009), available at http://www.msa.md.gov/megafile/msa/ 
speccol/sc2900/sc2908/000001/000420/html/index.html.  As Delegate Stockbridge 
promised, on page 352 is article IV, section 22 of the Indiana Constitution of 1851—one of 
that constitution’s three prohibitions on local and special laws.  THE AMERICAN’S GUIDE, 
supra, at 352.  However, Delegate Stockbridge did not seek to introduce a provision like 
article IV, section 23 of the Indiana Constitution of 1851, which stated that “[i]n all the 
cases enumerated in the preceding section, and in all other cases where a general law can 
be made applicable, all laws shall be general, and of uniform operation throughout the 
State.”  Id. at 353.  Moreover, no member proposed an equal privileges and immunities 
provision like article I, section 23 of the Indiana Constitution of 1851, which states, “The 
General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immuni-
ties, which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens.”  Id. at 350. 
 151. 2 DEBATES, supra note 148, at 801–02. 
 152. In debating a provision that was eventually rejected, which would have prevented 
local and special laws for the punishment of crimes and misdemeanors, regulating the 
practice of Courts of Justice, or authorizing or directing the trial of any case in any court, 
Delegate Stockbridge first argued that these types of court rules would be better resolved 
by local government.  Id. at 884.  In the next breath, however, Delegate Stockbridge see-
mingly changed his mind and argued statewide uniformity is the goal of this provision 
(which would not be aided by a patchwork of laws adopted by local government).  This 
suggests his concern was not local laws, but special laws.  Id. at 884, 891 (taking the posi-
tion that fees and salaries should be uniform, but to the extent that they cannot, should be 
set locally).  My point is not to criticize Delegate Stockbridge but to point out how difficult 
it was for the constitutional convention, particularly as it was operating before the advent 
of local home rule, to distinguish between the concepts of special and local laws.  
 153. Id. at 884, 891. 
 154. See id. at 883–84 (stating that the purpose of Delegate Stockbridge’s amendment 
was in concurrence with Delegate Edelen’s view that “[t]he process by which business is to 
be done in the courts is something which [should be left] to the courts themselves”). 
 155. See id. at 877 (noting that the legislature was frequently preoccupied by citizens’ 
demands, responding to which cost the State hundreds of dollars and hours of time). 
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complained of and which this section is designed to remedy; that is, 
the interference of the Legislature in cases where individual rights are 
concerned, and where parties have no opportunity of being properly 
represented and heard.”156  Delegate Chambers continued, “Let the 
Legislature adopt the principle upon which the courts are to act, and 
let the courts carry out those principles, upon the establishment by 
proof of the particular cases provided for.”157  Delegate Chambers de-
scribed how “influential parties” had abused the legislative process by 
having the legislature, for example, revise a defective deed, rather 
than using the established judicial process.158  Thus, the two principal 
participants in the debate, Republican Stockbridge and Democrat 
Chambers, each framed their description of the purpose of the 
amendment in terms of the separation of powers.159
Delegate Chambers went on to announce that he would vote 
against Delegate Stockbridge’s amendment and offer instead his own 
amendment, which was a general prohibition against special laws.
 
160  
Despite this, the convention body adopted Delegate Stockbridge’s 
enumerated special laws amendment, as amended, with no additional 
recorded discussion.161  The next morning, Delegate Chambers was 
finally permitted to offer his alternative, but instead of replacing Del-
egate Stockbridge’s amendment, Delegate Chamber’s amendment 
was transformed into the second sentence of article III, section 33 
without any recorded discussion or debate.162  The Maryland Consti-
tution was subsequently changed by the constitutional convention in 
1867, which slightly revised the enumerated list in the first sentence 
of article III, section 33, but left the second sentence untouched.163
 
 156. Id. at 878. 
  
The 1867 version of the special laws provision remains, to this day, the 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 887. 
 159. Use of special laws provisions to police the separation of powers is not unique to 
Maryland. See Green, supra note 92, at 371–72 (describing separation of powers as an im-
portant basis for the prohibition of special laws).  The Nebraska Supreme Court has ex-
pressed a related reason for its state constitutional ban on special laws: “It is because the 
legislative process lacks the safeguards of due process and the tradition of impartiality 
which restrain the courts from using their powers to dispense special favors that such con-
stitutional prohibitions against special laws were enacted.”  Haman v. Marsh, 467 N.W.2d 
836, 845 (Neb. 1991). 
 160. 2 DEBATES, supra note 148, at 887. 
 161. Id. at 896. 
 162. Id. at 896–97; see also PROCEEDINGS, supra note 148, at 297 (indicating no discussion 
or debate between the amendment submission and the vote).   
 163. PHILIP B. PERLMAN, DEBATES OF THE MARYLAND CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 
1867, at 115 (1923); PROCEEDINGS OF THE STATE CONVENTION TO FRAME A NEW 
CONSTITUTION 108 (1867). 
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text of what is now article III, section 33 of the Maryland Constitu-
tion.164
2.  Applying Originalist Theory to the History of Article III, Section 33 
 
After considering this history, I have several observations.  First, it 
is overly optimistic to believe that the recorded comments of a dozen 
or so delegates can be used to determine what the constitutional con-
vention as a whole intended.165  There is no way of knowing whether 
Delegate Stockbridge’s focus on protecting the legislature from inun-
dation by special requests was real, or, given his audience, a smart 
rhetorical decision.  There is no way of knowing whether Delegate 
Stockbridge spoke for the majority in describing the meaning of his 
amendment or merely verbally battered them into submission.166  
There is no way of knowing whether Delegate Chambers’s somewhat 
cryptic description of his amendment reflected anybody else’s view at 
all, because no one else discussed it on the record.167
Nevertheless, it is fair to note what the drafters of this provision 
did not say.  They did not say, as Judge Eldridge claimed in Cities Ser-
vice, that “[o]ne of the most important reasons,” or even mention as 
one of the reasons, “for the provision in the Constitution against spe-
cial legislation is to prevent one who has sufficient influence to secure 
  In short, the 
thought that these few pages of historical record can give the modern 
reader a roadmap for the modern interpretation of article III, section 
33 is unlikely.   
 
 164. Commentators writing in the years after ratification of article III, section 33 viewed 
the enumerated list of special topics important but utterly failed to ascribe any importance 
whatsoever to the second sentence of the provision. MYERS, supra note 141, at 78; Harry J. 
Green, A Study of the Legislature of the State of Maryland, in JOHNS HOPKINS U. STUD. HIST. & 
POL. SCI., Ser. XLVIII 16 (1930).  This suggests that nearly contemporaneous readers did 
not view the provision as particularly important. 
 165. See L. Harold Levinson, Interpreting State Constitutions by Resort to the Record, 6 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 567, 570–71 (1978) (expressing skepticism and proposing restrictive rules for 
use of convention records in interpreting state constitutional provisions); see also Farber, 
supra note 130, at 1088–89 (questioning whether the documentary evidence of federal 
constitutional convention debates is reliable); James Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: 
The Integrity of the Documentary Record, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1986) (acknowledging that 
some of the principal documents regarding the Constitutional Convention may not be re-
liable). 
 166. Reviewing the convention debates, one is left with the clear impression that Dele-
gate Stockbridge had little patience for the give and take of the constitutional convention.  
See, e.g., 2 DEBATES, supra note 148, at 884 (statement of Delegate Stockbridge) (respond-
ing to a fellow delegate about his amendment, “No, sir; I am tired of this catechi[z]ing and 
disputatious way of debating questions.”).   
 167. See generally id. at 876–96.  
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legislation from getting an undue advantage over others.”168  Not one 
single delegate expressed this view.169
Second, it is legitimate to take away from a review of these con-
vention debates the clear sense that the delegates intended this provi-
sion as a support to the separation of powers.  They wanted to ensure 
that categories of cases assigned to the judiciary could not instead be 
resolved by the legislature.
  Of course, it cannot be conclusively 
proved that the delegates were not thinking this.  Maybe it was, in 
their minds, an important reason for adopting the provision.  All the 
records can show is that if it was in their minds, they did not express 
it.  This is a point of fundamental importance.  The convention 
records simply do not support the Cities Service analysis. 
170  This suggests that the courts may be mi-
sreading the critical sentence: “And the General Assembly shall pass 
no special Law, for any case, for which provision has been made, by an 
existing General Law.”171  While courts have ignored the words “for 
any case” as if the phrase meant “in any instance” or “in every cir-
cumstance,”  what if they really were intended to mean “for every legal 
controversy”?  This reading would comport better with Delegate 
Chambers’s specific intent in introducing his amendment and gener-
ally with the debates at the 1864 Constitutional Convention, which in 
every circumstance centered on the problem of litigants having their 
legal disputes handled in the wrong branch of government.172
 
 168. Cities Serv. Co. v. Governor, 290 Md. 553, 568–69, 431 A.2d 663, 672 (1981) (quot-
ing Baltimore v. United Rys. & Elec. Co., 126 Md. 39, 52, 94 A. 378, 382 (1915)). 
  Such a 
 169. See generally 2 DEBATES, supra note 148, at 876–96.  I am making a distinction be-
tween Judge Eldridge’s statement about influential people and Delegate Chambers’s 
statement (quoted supra in the text accompanying note 158) because of Delegate Cham-
bers’s specific focus on the separation of powers.  See 2 DEBATES, supra note 148, at 887 
(discussing power of “influential people” while addressing the need and importance of the 
separation of powers).  Even if this is a distinction without a difference, only Delegate 
Chambers, a member of the minority party, made this argument.  
 170. See 2 DEBATES supra note 148, at 878 (statement of Delegate Chambers) (emphasiz-
ing the importance that courts analyze conformity of the facts with the law, rather than 
exercising their discretion regarding both facts and law, because the latter constitutes leg-
islation—a “power . . . the court ought [not] to be requested, or obligated, or even permit-
ted to exercise”).   
 171. MD. CONST. art. III, § 33 (emphasis added). 
 172. I also reviewed the debates regarding this provision to see how the delegates them-
selves used the word “case” or “cases” in the hope that it might give a clue about how they 
intended that the word be understood.  On some occasions, convention delegates used the 
word generically to mean “instances.”  See, e.g., 2 DEBATES, supra note 148, at 878 (“It would 
be very difficult to enumerate all the cases in which such a [name] change is necessary.”). 
At other times, the context makes plain that they were using the word in the more specific 
sense, to mean “lawsuit.”  See, e.g., id. at 877 (“There are other things which if they do not 
affect the direct pecuniary interests of men, are at least in the nature and form of a liti-
gated case . . . .”).  Thus, unfortunately, the evidence is inconclusive. 
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reading would also better comport with the interpretive dictum that 
requires us to give effect to every word of the Maryland constitution, 
because if “for any case” just means “always” it would be super-
fluous.173
Thus, an originalist would reject the Cities Service test but would 
not be able to provide a complete and convincing alternative inter-
pretation of Maryland’s special laws provision.  An originalist inter-
pretation is only able to provide a vague picture that the special laws 
provision reflected a general desire to maintain the separation of 
powers and prevent the legislature from resolving cases that should be 
litigated in court.  Together, these two observations make an impor-
tant point about originalism.  Originalism has serious limitations as a 
foundationalist interpretive theory.  In my mind, it cannot provide—
in advance—the answers to every interpretive question.  Nevertheless, 
a modern interpreter who ignores the historical record does so at sig-
nificant peril.  
 
C.  Moral Reasoning 
A completely different school of interpretive thought, led most 
famously by Professor Ronald Dworkin, advocates the explicit use of 
moral philosophy to discover the right answers to constitutional ques-
tions.174  Professor Dworkin separates the federal constitution into two 
categories of provisions: those whose content states an abstract moral 
principle,175 and those whose content is more specific and does not 
state a moral principle.176
 
 173. See Kadan v. Bd. of Supervisors of Elections, 273 Md. 406, 415–16, 329 A.2d 702, 
707 (1974) (quoting Johnson v. Duke, 180 Md. 434, 440, 24 A.2d 304, 307 (1942) (“It is an 
elementary rule of interpretation that effect should be given, if possible, to every section 
and clause of a written Constitution . . . .”)); see also Pickett v. Prince George’s County, 291 
Md. 648, 661, 436 A.2d 449, 456 (1981) (stating interpretive preference against construc-
tion of constitutional provision that will render it nugatory).  
  While the specific provisions are presuma-
bly interpreted according to their meaning, those stating a moral 
principle should be interpreted in accordance with what Professor 
Dworkin considers to be the underlying moral philosophy of the Con-
stitution: that a government should treat everyone “as having equal 
moral and political status; it must attempt, in good faith, to treat them 
all with equal concern; and it must respect whatever individual free-
 174. DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 27, at 2. 
 175. Id. at 7 (referring to the examples of “free speech,” “due process,” and “equal pro-
tection” as abstract moral language subject to the moral reading). 
 176. Id. at 8.  For example, the Third Amendment prohibits the government from quar-
tering soldiers in citizens’ houses in peacetime, which does not encompass a moral prin-
ciple.  Id.  
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doms are indispensible to those ends, including but not limited to the 
freedoms more specifically designated in the document.”177  Professor 
Dworkin argues that a judge following his system will be restrained 
not only by the text of the Constitution but also by the judge’s notion 
of integrity in interpreting the text—that judges must read the moral 
clauses of the Constitution in a manner that is consistent both with 
“the structural design of the Constitution as a whole” and also with 
“the dominant lines of past constitutional interpretation by other 
judges.”178
What can a moral reasoning analysis add to the understanding of 
state constitutions generally and the special laws prohibition of the 
Maryland Constitution specifically?  As an initial matter, it is some-
times hard with state constitutions to separate those provisions whose 
content contains statements of moral philosophy from those that do 
not.  The tendency to mandate certain actions in language of a moral 
character while framing others in concrete terms that are not subject 
to a moral reading may just be a function of drafting style.
 
179  Some-
times even the most important “moral” provisions of a state constitu-
tion can be drafted in a prosaic style.180
 
 177. Id. at 7–8. 
  Here too, article III, section 
33 provides a useful example.  If there is a moral principle at stake 
here (and there are obviously those who argue that there is), it is hid-
den in a provision that reads like a legislative procedural rule.  If ar-
ticle III, section 33 is a specific prohibition whose content does not 
state a moral principle, then Professor Dworkin would tell us to just 
 178. Id. at 10. 
 179. Id. at 7–8 (noting that some constitutional clauses are written to allow a moral in-
terpretation, while others lack the abstract quality required to apply a moral reading). 
 180. Many accounts have criticized early state constitutions for employing the exhorta-
tory “ought” rather than the mandatory “shall.”  See LEONARD LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE 
PRESS 184 (1985) (calling use of “ought” in early state constitutions “flabby” and “namby-
pamby”); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE GREAT RIGHTS OF MANKIND: A HISTORY OF THE 
AMERICAN BILL OF RIGHTS 91 (1992) (recognizing that drafters used the term “ought not” 
when the term “shall not” would have been the proper guarantee with respect to protected 
rights); J. PAUL SELSAM, THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION OF 1776: A STUDY IN 
REVOLUTIONARY DEMOCRACY 203–04 (1971) (noting that the words “ought to be” were 
used in place of the words “shall be” in several places throughout the Pennsylvania Consti-
tution).  But see TARR, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 88, at 77–79 (explaining that the use of 
terms like “ought not” was not a mistake, but rather by design according to the “republi-
can political theory” of government); Jeremy Elkins, Declarations of Rights, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH. 
ROUNDTABLE 243, 306–07 (1996) (noting that in using the conditional language the legis-
latures still intended the provisions to be taken seriously).   
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apply the text and that his moral reading cannot offer us any more in-
terpretive help.181
If, however, the prohibition on special laws does state an abstract 
moral principle, it should be interpreted in a way that is consistent 
with the constitution’s underlying moral principles.  If there is a way 
to discern the Maryland Constitution’s underlying moral principles—
through three major revisions and literally hundreds of amend-
ments—it is not apparent.
 
182  And the same is true for other state con-
stitutions, as well.  These documents are simply too long, too detailed, 
too internally conflicted, and too busy with the daily details of gov-
ernment to be susceptible to this type of analysis.183  Again, this sug-
gests a serious deficit in a theory of constitutional interpretation if it 
cannot be applied to constitutions other than the federal constitu-
tion.184
Finally, if we suppose that Professor Dworkin’s statement of the 
underlying constitutional principle of the U.S. Constitution is a uni-
versal American moral principle, we can try to apply it to Maryland’s 
prohibition against special laws.  Professor Dworkin’s statement of 
moral principle is focused on equality of treatment: “government 
must treat all those subject to its dominion as having equal moral and 
political status; it must attempt, in good faith, to treat them all with 
equal concern; and it must respect whatever individual freedoms are 
indispensible to those ends.”
 
185
 
 181. DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 
  Given Professor Dworkin’s focus on 
equal treatment, perhaps that should push us toward the interpreta-
tion of the special laws prohibition that will best effectuate the moral 
philosophy of equality.  Such a legal regime would look skeptically on 
any divergent treatment of people, especially if the basis for that clas-
sification is not a natural or obvious distinction.  One can easily im-
27, at 8 (recognizing that not all clauses in 
the Constitution are conducive to a moral reading and, as such, are given their plain text 
meaning).  
 182. It is possible to suggest that representative democracy is an underlying moral prin-
ciple of the Maryland Constitution.  As a moral principle, however, the principle of repre-
sentative democracy is at such a high level of abstraction and, in the Maryland Constitu-
tion, the principle is so thoroughly qualified, that I am not confident it provides a basis for 
any constitutional interpretation.      
 183. See G. Alan Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1169, 1170–71, 
1175–76 (1992) [hereinafter Tarr, State Constitutions] (noting that state constitutions are 
on average three times as long as the federal constitution and contain over a hundred 
amendments that serve to correct antiquated provisions and manage aspects of the gov-
ernment that might otherwise be left to legislative discretion). 
 184. See supra note 138 (discussing defect in originalism that it may be inapplicable to 
constitutions other than the U.S. Constitution). 
 185. DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 27, at 7–8. 
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agine a court that is trying to follow Dworkin’s interpretive theory 
adopting a test like the “necessity test,” endorsed by the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court in Appeal of Ayars, which says that “classification . . . is 
essentially unconstitutional, unless a necessity therefore exists,—a ne-
cessity springing from manifest peculiarities, clearly distinguishing 
those of one class from each of the other classes, and imperatively 
demanding legislation for each class, separately, that would be useless 
and detrimental to the others.”186
This interpretation, however, misunderstands Professor Dwor-
kin’s conception of equality.  Professor Dworkin links his views of 
equality to his idea of moral membership in a community.
 
187  He dis-
cusses German Jews under Hitler, Catholics in Northern Ireland, na-
tionalists in the Caucasus, and separatists in Quebec as groups that 
are not—or in some cases claim not to be—afforded moral member-
ship in the right political community.188  Thus, Professor Dworkin is 
defining equality as the prohibition of discrimination, which is classi-
cally the subject of state and federal equal protection guarantees, spe-
cifically the types of classification against “discrete and insular minori-
ties” that the Supreme Court subjects to strict scrutiny or at least to 
heightened scrutiny.189  That is not to say that Professor Dworkin ac-
cepts the Supreme Court’s classifications or the levels of review analy-
sis, but it is fair to say that he is expressing similar equality concerns.  
But Dworkin’s conception of equality—at least as the Constitution’s 
central moral principle—does not appear to be describing equality as 
a right to be treated the same as others or a right to prevent others 
from getting more favorable treatment,190 which is the topic of state 
constitutional special laws and equal privileges and immunities provi-
sions.191
 
 186. 16 A. 356, 363 (Pa. 1889). For a discussion of the “necessity test,” see infra text ac-
companying notes 
  In this way, Professor Dworkin’s analysis seems consistent 
226–229.  
 187. DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 27, at 23. 
 188. Id. 
 189. The Maryland Constitution does not contain a clear textual equal protection guar-
antee.  Instead, Maryland courts imply that guarantee from article 24 of the Maryland Dec-
laration of Rights, which is considered to be our “due process” analog.  See, e.g., Attorney 
General v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 426 A.2d 929 (1981); FRIEDMAN, STATE CONSTITUTION, 
supra note 143, at 35. 
 190. DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 27, at 9 (stating that although it was once 
debated that the Equal Protection Clause merely required that “legal benefits conferred 
on everyone . . . must not be denied . . . to anyone,” history shows instead that the framers 
“did not mean to lay down so weak a principle as that one” as the outer limit of equality). 
 191. For a discussion of state constitutional equal privileges and immunities provisions, 
see David Schuman, The Right to “Equal Privileges and Immunities”: A State’s Version of “Equal 
Protection,” 13 VT. L. REV. 221 (1988).  Of course, that is likely a fallacy created by my as-
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with Supreme Court jurisprudence, which treats economic equality as 
a lesser value and accords it only rational basis review.  Thus, at least 
as Professor Dworkin has stated the underlying moral principles on 
which American constitutions are based, his moral reading does not 
compel us toward any particular reading of article III, section 33.192
D.  Comparative Constitutional Law 
 
In recent years, the use of comparative constitutional law as a 
tool of constitutional interpretation has become increasingly contro-
versial.193  The reliance on international sources—always the most 
controversial—by the liberal majorities in Atkins v. Virginia,194 Lawrence 
v. Texas,195 and Roper v. Simmons,196 and the condemnation of that re-
liance by the conservative dissents197 has served as a catalyst for the 
debate.  Justice Stephen Breyer, a leading judicial proponent of re-
liance on international sources, has said that certain legal questions 
are common to all people, and that “[r]eaching out to . . . other na-
tions, reading their decisions, seems useful, even though they cannot 
determine the outcome of a question that arises under the American 
Constitution.”198
 
sumption that Professor Dworkin was stating a universal American moral philosophy ra-
ther than the moral philosophy that he found underlying the U.S. Constitution.   
  Of course, Justice Breyer does not view international 
precedents as binding or controlling, but merely as a potential source 
 192. To be sure, it is not comfortable to reject this conception of equality as a moral 
precept.  Professor Dworkin’s notion of integrity, however, requires an interpreter to apply 
only those moral principles that are clearly compelled by the Constitution and the “domi-
nant lines of past constitutional interpretation by other judges.”  DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S 
LAW, supra note 27, at 10.  In the obverse situation, I was responding—unknowingly—to 
Professor Dworkin’s conception of equality when I wrote that a failure to incorporate an 
equal protection guarantee into the Maryland Declaration of Rights through article 24 
would have been “embarrassing.”  FRIEDMAN, STATE CONSTITUTION, supra note 143, at 35.  
See supra note 189. 
 193. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, The Supreme Court, The Law of Nations, and Citations of For-
eign Law: The Lessons of History, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1335, 1340–44 (2007). 
 194. 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002). 
 195. 539 U.S. 558, 572–73 (2003). 
 196. 543 U.S. 551, 575–77 (2005). 
 197. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 604 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the lack of a 
national consensus regarding the juvenile death penalty prevents the international con-
sensus from serving the confirmatory role the majority attributes to it); Lawrence, 539 U.S. 
at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (rejecting the majority’s discussion of the “views of a ‘wider 
civilization’” as “meaningless dicta”); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 322 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) 
(describing the majority’s reliance on foreign laws as a “defect” in the Court’s decision). 
 198. Justice Stephen Breyer, Discussion at the American University Washington College 
of Law (Jan. 13, 2005), in 3 INT’L J. CONST. L. 519, 528 (2005). 
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of inspiration and instruction.199  Justice Antonin Scalia, a leading op-
ponent, has argued, “We don’t have the same moral and legal frame-
work as the rest of the world, and never have.”200  To Justice Scalia, fo-
cused as he is on the jurisprudence of American originalism, 
“obviously foreign law is irrelevant.”201  Other judicial critics also note 
the inherent difficulties in understanding foreign precedents, “which 
necessarily arise from unfamiliar legal, political, and governmental 
terrains” and the likelihood of result-oriented reliance, in which 
judges selectively cite only that comparative law that supports their 
positions.202  Academics have joined the debate on both sides.203
State constitutional law provides an opportunity to evaluate this 
debate.  State constitutional interpreters are routinely confronted 
with the task of evaluating the precedential weight to be given to sister 
state decisions interpreting their state constitutions, especially when a 
provision in one state’s constitution was borrowed from the constitu-
tion of another state.
 
204
Presented with a foreign court precedent, a court ought to eva-
luate (1) the extent to which the issue presented in that case parallels 
the question it is facing; (2) the similarities and differences between 
  This task is analogous to the Supreme Court’s 
use of international precedents.  In both cases, the precedent that is 
being evaluated is merely persuasive.   
 
 199. See id. (“[W]ith all the uncertainties involved, I would rather have the judge read 
pertinent foreign cases while understanding that the foreign cases are not controlling. I 
would rather have the judge treat those cases cautiously, using them with care, than simply 
to ignore them. I would rather hope that judges will exercise proper control, taking the 
cases for what they are worth, than have an absolute rule that says judges may never look at 
foreign decisions.”). 
 200. Justice Antonin Scalia, Discussion at the American University Washington College 
of Law (Jan. 13, 2005), in 3 INT’L J. CONST. L. 519, 521 (2005). 
 201. Id. at 525. 
 202. Mark C. Rahdert, Comparative Constitutional Advocacy, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 584 
(2007). 
 203. See Farber, supra note 193, at 1340–44 (summarizing the scholarly debate over the 
use of foreign law in Supreme Court opinions); Rahdert, supra note 202, at 575–89; Tush-
net, Comparative Constitutional Law, supra note 29, at 1228. 
 204. See, e.g., TARR, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 88, at 205–08 (recognizing that states 
must decide whether the interpretation of the originating state will be endorsed).  Treat-
ing state constitutional law as “comparative American constitutional law” is a rather new 
innovation, but it hardly seems controversial to me.  See WILLIAMS, STATE CONSTITUTIONS, 
supra note 30, at 15–16 (noting that “comparative American constitutional law” is impor-
tant and warrants the attention of interpreters).  Although I have treated international 
comparative constitutional law in the context of the controversy over the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s citation to international precedents, there are also those who would create a foun-
dationalist interpretive theory out of international comparative constitutional law.  Cf. 
DAVID M. BEATTY, THE ULTIMATE RULE OF LAW 36–37 (2004) (suggesting that a compara-
tive analysis of interpretations of liberty would provide a “satisfactory account” of the rights 
and freedoms able to be claimed by individuals). 
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the relevant provisions of the two constitutions and the systems that 
they create;205 and (3) the persuasiveness of the arguments made by 
the foreign court.206
Maryland’s prohibition against special laws provides an excellent 
lens through which to view this point.  There is, however, one impor-
tant difference between state and federal comparative practice.
  While the second factor—similarity of constitu-
tions and systems—may differ greatly if the foreign precedent is an in-
ternational one, it still falls on the same continuum as if we were dis-
cussing sister state interpretation. Obviously, the Nebraska 
Constitution is much more similar to the Maryland Constitution than 
the Constitution of Norway is to the U.S. Constitution.  That does not 
mean, however, that U.S. constitutional analysis cannot be informed 
by the constitutional judgments of a constitutional court in Norway.  
It just means that the analysis is less persuasive.  In this way, state con-
stitutional jurisprudence, which does this sort of work all of the time, 
can offer useful guidance to interpreters of the U.S. Constitution. 
207  
Comparative state constitutional analysis often begins with an exami-
nation of the state from which a particular provision has originated, 
but when that provision has already been authoritatively interpreted 
by the originating state, the borrowing state “is understood to have 
adopted the provision as interpreted, to have included within its con-
stitution the authoritative interpretation of the meaning of the provi-
sion.”208  Maryland has never had occasion to adopt this interpretive 
rule, but that is probably due to a lack of opportunity, rather than a 
disagreement with the rule.209
 
 205. See Farber, supra note 
  As one of the original thirteen colo-
193, at 1361–62 (“Essentially, the closer a foreign jurisdiction 
is to the U.S. in terms of historical connections, constitutional provisions, and legal institu-
tions, the more relevant that jurisdiction’s decisions.”). 
 206. Id. at 1362 (“Foreign law is also entitled to more weight when it is persuasively justi-
fied; and to less weight when it seems to reflect another country’s peculiarities.”). 
 207. This difference is, however, likely a practical rather than an analytical one.  Had 
the United States borrowed a constitutional provision from another country or from one 
of the States with a definitive judicial interpretation already annexed at the time of its 
adoption, a court should have probably treated that judicial interpretation as a binding 
precedent at least until the U.S. Supreme Court decided to change it. 
 208. TARR, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 88, at 207; see also WILLIAMS, STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 30, at 339–40 (describing this as a “very important approach” 
to interpretation of borrowed state constitutional provisions). 
 209. See Hitchcock v. State, 213 Md. 273, 284, 131 A.2d 714, 719 (1957) (“Where a con-
stitutional provision has received a judicial construction and then is incorporated into a 
new or revised constitution, it will be presumed to have been re-adopted with the know-
ledge of the previous construction and to have been intended to have the meaning given it 
by that construction.”).   
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nies, Maryland has had its provisions borrowed much more frequently 
than it has borrowed the provisions of other constitutions.210
The application of the interpretive rule in this circumstance is 
not so simple.  The history of the debates shows that Delegate Henry 
Stockbridge intended to use article IV, section 22 of the Indiana Con-
stitution of 1851 as the model for his amendment,
 
211 the list of enu-
merated topics about which the legislature is prohibited from passing 
special laws, which became the first sentence of Maryland’s article III, 
section 33.212
It is not clear, however, whether and to what extent Delegate 
Ezekiel Forman Chambers used the subsequent section of the Indiana 
Constitution—article IV, section 23—as a basis for his amendment, 
which became the second sentence of Maryland’s article III, section 
33.
   
213
 
 210. Dan Friedman, Tracing the Lineage: Textual and Conceptual Similarities in the Revolu-
tionary-Era State Declarations of Rights of Virginia, Maryland, and Delaware, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 929 
(2002) (describing interstate borrowing of state constitutional provisions during the Revo-
lutionary-Era) [hereinafter Friedman, Tracing the Lineage]; cf. Neal Devins, How State Su-
preme Courts Take Consequences into Account: Toward A State-Centered Understanding of State 
Constitutionalism, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1629, 1639 (2010) (“[K]nowing that Congress would 
have to approve their constitutions, later-admitted states would borrow from earlier state 
constitutions and the Federal Constitution.”). 
  Thus, while decisions of the Indiana Supreme Court between 
 211. See supra note 150 and accompanying text. 
 212. This history also demonstrates the fictional nature of this interpretive rule.  There 
is no evidence to suggest that Delegate Stockbridge knew about the Indiana Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the model provision.  Stockbridge did not clearly disclose the 
model’s Indiana roots, let alone its interpretive history, to the convention body.  See general-
ly 2 DEBATES, supra note 148, at 876–96 (recounting debates relating to Stockbridge’s 
amendment).  And nobody told the voters anything about it.  See supra text accompanying 
notes 137–139 (discussing voters’ understanding of the special laws provision).  Thus, the 
idea that Maryland voters specifically chose to bind themselves to the Indiana decisions is 
pure fiction. 
 213. See supra text accompanying notes 148–156 (discussing the process by which 
Chambers’s amendment was proposed and adopted); see also 2 DEBATES, supra note 148, at 
882, 885, 896–97 (documenting proceedings related to Stockbridge’s two failed attempts 
and final successful attempt to introduce his amendment); PROCEEDINGS OF THE STATE 
CONVENTION, supra note 148, at 297 (documenting Chambers’s amendment and subse-
quent vote adopting that amendment).  There is an important textual difference between 
IND. CONST. art. IV, § 23 and the second sentence of MD. CONST. art. III, § 33: Indiana’s 
Constitution prohibits special laws in “all . . . cases where a general law can be made appli-
cable,” IND. CONST. art. IV, § 23 (emphasis added), while Maryland’s prohibits “special 
Law[s], for any case, for which provision has been made, by an existing General Law.”  MD. 
CONST. art. III, § 33 (emphasis added).  Thus, Indiana’s provision asks for a judgment 
about what general laws could conceptually be drafted, while Maryland’s provision asks 
only whether a general law already exists.  See Green, supra note 92, at 369–370  (discussing 
approaches of various states, including Indiana and Maryland, to the issue of when courts 
may determine whether a general law can be made applicable).  It seems to me, however, 
that the textual difference would have made a difference in the analysis—but not the out-
come—of Stocking v. State, 7 Ind. 326 (1855), discussed infra at notes 215–216 and accom-
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1851 and 1864 concerning its article IV, section 22 ought to be bind-
ing precedents in interpreting the first sentence of Maryland’s article 
III, section 33,214
During the period between 1851 and 1864, the Indiana Supreme 
Court decided three special law cases.
 it is unclear whether we should also treat as binding 
the decisions of the Indiana Supreme Court between 1851 and 1864 
concerning its article IV, section 23, had there been any.   
215  These cases, while not en-
tirely clear in defining special laws or even which constitutional provi-
sion was being interpreted, hold that determining whether a law is 
special is a judicial function.216  Thus, by 1864 when Maryland bor-
rowed Indiana’s prohibition of special laws, Indiana law provided for 
rigorous judicial enforcement of both of its constitutional special laws 
provisions.217
 
panying text, in which there was no existing general law and the Indiana Supreme Court 
found that no general law could be adopted.  7 Ind. at 328.  Professor Thomas F. Green, 
Jr. has derided as “folly” and “fallacy” those provisions, like Indiana’s, that ask if “a general 
law can be made applicable,” Green, supra note 
  To the extent that those opinions were predicated on 
92, at 367 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted), because, in his view, a general law can always be drafted.  Id. at 366–68.  For a differ-
ent view on this topic, see Oscar Leser, Report on the Evils of Special and Local Legislation, in 
NINTH ANNUAL MEETINGS OF THE MARYLAND STATE BAR ASSOCIATION 160, 178 (1903) (at-
tributing underenforcement of article III, section 33 to the difference between whether a 
general law can be made applicable or whether a general law has been made applicable). 
 214. The conclusion that the old Indiana cases, discussed infra note 215 and accompa-
nying text, were binding precedents at the time that Maryland adopted the provision has 
little continuing significance as the Maryland cases have ignored these Indiana precedents 
for more than sixty years.  For example, see supra Part III.B, for a discussion of the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland’s departure from precedent in Cities Service Co. v. Governor, 290 Md. 
553, 431 A.2d 663 (1981). 
 215. Horack, supra note 115, at 111 n.7 & 8 (listing three cases: Madison & Indianapolis 
R.R. Co. v. Whiteneck, 8 Ind. 217 (1856); Stocking v. State, 7 Ind. 326 (1855); and Thomas 
v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 5 Ind. 4 (1854), overruled in part by Gentile v. State, 29 Ind. 409 (1868)). 
 216. See Madison, 8 Ind. at 219 (“[W]hen [special legislation] takes place it will be for 
the Court to judge, . . . under section 23, of article 4, of the constitution, whether more 
general legislation could reasonably have been made applicable; and, also, whether such 
special legislation conflicts with any other constitutional provision.” (citation omitted); 
Stocking, 7 Ind. at 328 (holding, without discussion of the court’s power to consider the 
issue, that a statute creating a new judicial district was not a special law under the Indiana 
Constitution, article IV, section 23, because no general law could have been made applica-
ble); Thomas, 5 Ind. at 7 (“Whether the legislature have, in the case at bar, acted within the 
scope of their authority, is, in our opinion, a proper subject of judicial inquiry.”)). 
 217. Ironically, in 1868, the Indiana Supreme Court abruptly reversed course and, in 
Gentile v. State, 29 Ind. 409 (1868), held that the question of whether a law is “special” is for 
the legislature to decide and not subject to review by the courts.  Id. at 413–15.  See also Ho-
rack, supra note 115, at 112–13 (noting that the Gentile court determined that “judicial re-
view of special legislation [was] unwise”); Jon Laramore, The Demise of Special Laws? Dispel-
ling Myths Generated by Kimsey, 46 RES GESTAE, May 2003, at 35, 35 (discussing period 
during which the Indiana Supreme Court “declined to review laws under Article 4, sec-
tions 22 and 23”).  That decision, however, was rendered after Maryland adopted its own 
prohibition on special laws and therefore, because “no state can know how another state 
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the provision that Delegate Stockbridge borrowed, or to the extent 
that Delegate Chambers was also borrowing from the Indiana Consti-
tution, these precedents should be a part of Maryland constitutional 
law as well. 
The next task of comparative state constitutional law requires us 
to evaluate how other states interpret their special laws prohibition 
and determine whether those interpretations are useful for interpret-
ing Maryland’s analogous provision.  Forty-four of the fifty states have 
state constitutional prohibitions on special laws.218  These prohibitions 
generally take one of three forms.219
 
will interpret a provision in the future, . . . the borrowing state is not bound by whatever 
changes in interpretation might occur subsequent to ratification.”  TARR, 
UNDERSTANDING, supra note 
  First, eleven states have a list of 
88, at 207.  Thus, Gentile is not a binding precedent in Mary-
land, although it might serve as persuasive authority.  The claim that Gentile should be 
used as persuasive authority, however, is undermined by the fact that by 1930, the Indiana 
Supreme Court reversed field again and resumed its role determining whether laws passed 
by the Indiana state legislature were unconstitutionally special.  Heckler v. Conter, 187 
N.E. 878, 879 (Ind. 1933) (disapproving of the reasoning in Gentile as allowing the legisla-
ture to “arbitrarily decide that a general law cannot be made applicable” and have its deci-
sion be unreviewable); Laramore, supra, at 35 (noting the Indiana Supreme Court’s 
change of course); Horack, supra note 115, at 113–15 (discussing significance of Heckler).  
In other states, the state constitutional prohibition on special laws was subsequently 
amended to specify that the issue is justiciable in the courts. KAN. CONST. art. II, § 17 
(amended 1905), reprinted in KANSAS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION: A REPRINT OF THE 
PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION WHICH FRAMED THE CONSTITUTION OF 
KANSAS AT WYANDOTTE IN JULY, 1859, at 579 (James L. King et al. eds., 1920); see also An-
derson v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 95 P. 583, 586–87 (Kan. 1908) (discussing 1905 amendment to 
the Kansas Constitution, article II, section 17, which granted the courts power to deter-
mine the constitutionality of a special law).  However, Kansas has since amended its consti-
tution such that it no longer prohibits special laws.  See Ullrich v. Thomas County, 676 P.2d 
127, 131 (Kan. 1984) (acknowledging that although the Kansas constitution originally 
prohibited special laws, it has since been amended to eliminate that provision). 
 218. The six state constitutions generally understood to lack a true prohibition on spe-
cial laws are Hawaii, Kansas, Mississippi, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont.  But 
see Cloe & Marcus, supra note 103, at 351 & n.1 (writing before Hawaii statehood, identify-
ing only four states without special laws provisions: Connecticut, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, and Vermont).  The case of Hawaii is arguable as several sections of that 
state’s constitution require all laws to be general laws.  See, e.g., HAW. CONST. art XI, § 5 
(“The legislative power over the lands owned by or under the control of the State and its 
political subdivisions shall be exercised only by general laws, except in respect to transfers 
to or for the use of the State, or a political subdivision, or any department or agency the-
reof.”); Sierra Club v. Dep’t of Transp., 202 P.3d 1226, 1245 (Haw. 2009) (discussing pro-
visions of Hawaii’s Constitution that require general laws). 
 219. Authorities differ on how to categorize the various forms of prohibitions.  Professor 
Robert F. Williams describes these prohibitions as “contain[ing] either general or detailed 
limitations on the objects of legislation.”  Robert F. Williams, Equality Guarantees in State 
Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1195, 1209 (1985) [hereinafter Williams, Equality Guar-
antees].  The most detailed taxonomy finds six or more variations on these themes.  Cloe & 
Marcus, supra note 103, at 351–53. 
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specific instances in which special laws are prohibited.220  Second, 
thirteen states have a general prohibition of all special laws where a 
general law applies.221  Third, twenty states, including Maryland, have 
both of these forms.222  Courts in states other than Maryland have 
been nearly uniform in adopting a very deferential “rational” or “rea-
sonable” basis-type test to evaluate special law claims under their re-
spective state constitutions.223  This is not a circumstance in which 
there is a majority rule and a minority rule.  All states except Mary-
land apply very deferential rational basis-type standards.224
Even if all states with special laws prohibitions have adopted de-
ferential rational basis-type tests, as part of the comparative constitu-
 
 
 220. ALA. CONST. art. IV, §§ 104, 105, 110; CONN. CONST. art. X, § 1; DEL. CONST. art. II, 
§ 19; FLA. CONST. art. III, § 11; IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 19; IND. CONST. art. 4, § 22; LA. 
CONST. art. III, § 12; N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 17; N.C. CONST. art. II, § 24; WASH. CONST. art. 
II, § 28; WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 31. 
 221. ALASKA CONST. art. II, § 19; CAL. CONST. art. 4, § 16; GA. CONST. art. III, § VI; ILL. 
CONST. art. IV, § 13; ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 3, § 13; MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. 10, pt. 2, cl. 1, 
art. 4; MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 29; MINN. CONST. art. XII, § 1; MONT. CONST. art. V, § 12; 
N.D. CONST. art. IV, § 13; OHIO CONST. art. II, § 26; TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 8; UTAH 
CONST. art. VI, § 26. 
 222. ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 19; ARK. CONST. art. 5, §§ 24–25; COLO. CONST. art. V, 
§ 25; IOWA CONST. art. III, § 30; KY. CONST. § 59; MO. CONST. art. III, § 40; NEB. CONST. 
art. III, § 18; NEV. CONST. art 4, §§ 20–21; N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7, pt. 7–10; N.M. CONST. 
art. IV, § 24; OKLA. CONST. art. V, §§ 46, 59; OR. CONST. art. IV, §§ 23, 27; PA. CONST. art. 
III, § 32; S.C. CONST. art. III, § 34; S.D. CONST. art. III, § 23; TEX. CONST. art. 3, § 56; VA. 
CONST. art. IV, §§ 14–15; W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 39; WYO. CONST. art. III, § 27. 
 223. See, e.g., Williams v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of N.C., 581 S.E.2d 415, 425 (N.C. 2003) 
(discussing a “reasonable classification” test); Wings Field Preservation Assocs., L.P. v. 
Commonwealth, 776 A.2d 311, 316 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001) (finding the Pennsylvania Con-
stitution “allows a legislative classification that has some rational relationship to a proper 
state purpose”); U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. City of Columbia, 165 S.E.2d 272, 274 (S.C. 1969) 
(noting that “[t]here must be some rational basis” for creating a legislative classification); 
Laurels of Bon Air, LLC v. Med. Facilities of Am. LIV Ltd., 659 S.E.2d 561, 568 (Va. Ct. 
App. 2008) (noting that Virginia applies a rational basis test when determining the consti-
tutionality of special legislation); Atchinson v. Erwin, 302 S.E.2d 78, 84 (W. Va. 1983) (stat-
ing that classifications must be rational to comply with constitutional requirements); see 
also Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Evolution of Equality in State Constitutional Law, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 
1013, 1049 (2003) (describing how state courts view rational basis as the appropriate stan-
dard of review for special laws provisions in state constitutions); Williams, Equality Guaran-
tees, supra note 219, at 1222 (“[M]any state courts interpret special laws provisions by apply-
ing federal equal protection analysis”).  Implicit in the conclusion that other states with 
constitutional special laws prohibitions uniformly adopt something akin to a rational basis 
test is the view that state constitutional equal privileges and immunities provisions are dif-
ferent from special laws prohibitions.  Cf. Schuman, supra note 191, at 223 & n.15 (noting 
that while some states have an “equal privileges and immunities” clause, others have “func-
tionally comparable provisions prohibiting ‘special laws’”). 
 224. Compare State v. Good Samaritan Hosp. of Md., Inc., 299 Md. 310, 330, 473 A.2d 
892, 902 (1984) (presuming special laws provisions are unconstitutional and applying a 
multi-factor test to determine if a law meets the special law requirements), with supra note 
223 (listing examples of the states using a rational basis test).  
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tional analysis, we should also determine if there is criticism of that 
deferential standard in the sister states.  Donald Marritz argues that 
Pennsylvania has improperly abandoned its historical special laws juri-
sprudence in favor of the deferential federal equal protection stan-
dards.225  Marritz advocates a return to two much more restrictive tests 
that Pennsylvania courts had once used.  For classifications that “im-
plicate the most basic rights of Pennsylvania citizens, as set out in the 
Declaration of Rights,”226 he urges the re-adoption of the “necessity 
test.”227  As set forth in Appeal of Ayars,228 the necessity test holds a clas-
sification to be “essentially unconstitutional, unless a necessity there-
for exists,—a necessity springing from manifest peculiarities, clearly 
distinguishing those of one class from each of the other classes, and 
imperatively demanding legislation for each class, separately, that 
would be useless and detrimental to the others.”229  For those cases 
that do not implicate fundamental rights, Marritz advocates what he 
calls the “enhanced version of the ‘fair and substantial’” relation 
test.230  Derived from Kroger Co. v. O’Hara Township,231 this test re-
quires a court to first “determin[e] whether the classification involved 
[is] fairly and substantially related to the purpose of the law,” and 
then “‘carefully review’ the statute in question to ensure that it ‘sub-
stantially further[s] the statutory objective.’”232
Marritz’s argument in support of Pennsylvania’s re-adoption of 
this pair of highly restrictive tests is based on the history of Pennsylva-
nia’s adoption of its special laws provisions.  Marritz (1) describes the 
widespread problem of legislative corruption and special treatment of 
 
 
 225. Marritz, supra note 80, at 172, 184; see also Williams, Misguided, supra note 35, at 347 
(suggesting that Pennsylvania courts’ application of federal protection standards ignores 
constitutional texts, history, and lessons of federalism, and reduces the state constitutional 
protections to a “mere row of shadows”). 
 226. Marritz, supra note 80, at 213.  See also Pa. Decl. of Rts. (itemizing twenty-eight basic 
rights guaranteed to all Pennsylvanians).  
 227. See Marritz, supra note 80, at 204 (stating that the necessity test not only “coincides 
with the history and purpose of the special laws prohibition,” but also “best implements 
the settled determined purpose on [the] part of the people to hold back from the legisla-
ture the power to enact local and special laws.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 228. 16 A. 356 (Pa. 1889). 
 229. Id. at 363. 
 230. Marritz, supra note 80, at 213 (noting that this enhanced fair and substantial test 
offers a “reasonable alternative” to the necessity test by recognizing that “the right to be 
free from special laws is a constitutional right worthy of great protection”). 
 231. 392 A.2d 266 (Pa. 1978). 
 232. Marritz, supra note 80, at 213 (quoting Kroger Co. v. O’Hara Twp., 392 A.2d 266, 
276 (Pa. 1978)). 
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corporate interests in the Pennsylvania legislature;233 (2) links that 
problem to the call for the Pennsylvania constitutional convention of 
1874;234 (3) identifies the special laws prohibition as a key reform in 
the constitution that was specifically designed to address the problems 
of corruption and unequal treatment;235 and (4) makes a “linkage” 
between the intent of the drafters and the ratifiers of the provision.236
Comparative constitutional law helps us answer whether and to 
what extent the Pennsylvania history that Marritz presents, and the 
conclusions that he suggests, should influence our understanding of 
the Maryland special laws provision.  Earlier in this Article, I sug-
gested a three-part framework for comparative constitutional law that 
can now be modified as follows: In deciding whether to adopt an out-
of-state theory of interpretation, one must evaluate (1) the extent to 
which the issue presented parallels the question we are facing; (2) the 
similarities and differences between the relevant provisions of the two 
constitutions and the systems that they create; and (3) the persuasive-
ness of the interpretation.
 
237
As to the first inquiry, Marritz and I are engaged in precisely the 
same enterprise, seeking the appropriate interpretation of our respec-
tive states’ special laws prohibition. 
 
Jumping to the second inquiry, there are vast differences be-
tween the Pennsylvania history told by Marritz and the history of the 
Maryland special laws provision.238
 
 233. Id. at 185–89 (describing the historical prevalence of special legislation and noting 
that special interests had “perverted the legislative process from its original purpose of 
serving the general welfare to that of serving private interests” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  
  Even allowing for the fact that 
Marritz has distilled the historical record for the purpose of making 
 234. Id. at 190–91 (noting that in response to the growing demand for reform, the legis-
lature “enacted a statute calling for a convention to amend the constitution”). 
 235. Id. at 192–93 (“[T]he ‘most emphatic expression’ of the new limitations on the 
powers of the legislature concerned not procedure, but substance—the prohibition 
against special laws.  This was ‘[t]he great change’ wrought by the new constitution and 
the ‘most important of all the amendments.’” (citation omitted)). 
 236. Id. at 194–95 (suggesting that the intent of the drafters was to create a restraint on 
private privilege); see also Perkins v. Philadelphia, 27 A. 356, 361 (Pa. 1893) (discussing the 
people’s intent in the constitution to ban local and special laws); see generally William A. 
Russ, Jr., The Origin of the Ban on Special Legislation in the Constitution of 1873, 11 PA. HIST. 
260 (1944) (describing the roots of the ban on special legislation).  For a discussion of 
theories of “linkage” between drafter and ratifier intent, see WILLIAMS, SEEKING CERTAINTY, 
supra note 30, at 320–21.  
 237. See supra text accompanying notes 205–206.  
 238. Compare Donald Marritz, Making Equality Matter (Again): The Prohibition Against Spe-
cial Laws in the Pennsylvania Constitution, 3 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 161, 186–94 (1993) (discuss-
ing Pennsylvania’s motivation for special laws provision), with supra Part IV.B.1. (discussing 
the history of Maryland’s ban on special laws). 
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his case, the differences are great.  In Pennsylvania, Marritz reports 
pervasive complaints about legislative corruption and favoritism to-
ward corporate interests.239  In Maryland, I have discovered no evi-
dence before or at the constitutional convention of any such com-
plaints.  In Pennsylvania, Marritz reports that solving the problems of 
legislative corruption and corporate favoritism was a leading reason 
for calling the constitutional convention.  In Maryland, these reasons 
were never mentioned; instead, issues of the Civil War precipitated 
the call to convention.240  Most importantly, Marritz identifies Penn-
sylvania’s special laws prohibition as the key method of combating leg-
islative corruption and corporate favoritism.241  By contrast, in Mary-
land, the discussion of the adoption of a special laws prohibition was 
absolutely devoid of any suggestion of legislative corruption or corpo-
rate favoritism.  Instead, the Maryland framers voiced concerns about 
protecting legislators from the unreasonable demands of their consti-
tuents.242
As to the third inquiry, while Marritz’s historical recitation and 
proposed interpretation is compelling, it has not been adopted in 
Pennsylvania or any other state.  Instead, the tide seems very much to 
be flowing in the opposite direction, toward less restrictive interpreta-
tions of special laws provisions.
  This compels the nearly inescapable conclusion that the 
two states adopted similar (although not identical) provisions as a 
cure for different problems.  While it is reasonable that Pennsylvania’s 
special laws provision should be interpreted in a manner that reflects 
the intent of its drafters and ratifiers (to prevent legislative corruption 
and corporate favoritism to protect equal treatment), it is also reason-
able that Maryland’s provision should be interpreted in a manner that 
reflects the intent of its drafters and ratifiers (to protect the legisla-
ture from unreasonable constituent requests and to reinforce the se-
paration of powers). 
243
Comparative constitutional law is—contrary to claims by some on 
the U.S. Supreme Court and their adherents—a helpful practice in 
understanding Maryland’s special laws provision.  A review of sister 
state constitutions and the analysis of those constitutions shows that 
Maryland’s Cities Service test is outside the mainstream of more defe-
 
 
 239. Marritz, supra note 80, at 193–94. 
 240. See supra text accompanying notes 140–144. 
 241. Marritz, supra note 80, at 186–91.  
 242. See 2 DEBATES, supra note 148, at 877 (citing the burden borne by the legislature in 
spending three quarters of its time addressing the “petty things” brought by constituents).  
 243. See supra note 223 (listing examples of states applying a more lenient, rational basis 
test in evaluating special laws). 
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rential tests applied by sister states.244  While this alone does not com-
pel a change in Maryland’s interpretation, it provides important per-
suasive authority supporting a change.245
E.  Structural Reasoning Analysis 
  Nevertheless, because com-
parative constitutional interpretation cannot provide a binding 
interpretation of Maryland’s constitution, and because of the exis-
tence of unique provisions for which there are no comparisons, it 
cannot answer all questions of state constitutional interpretation. 
Structural reasoning, as a theory of constitutional interpretation, 
requires an interpreter to consider not just the text of the constitu-
tion, but to reason from the structure and relation created by the 
text.246  Thus, although the concepts of “federalism,” “separation of 
powers,” and “majoritarianism” do not appear in the text of the fed-
eral constitution, these underlying structural concepts inform our 
understanding of the document and those concepts should be relied 
upon to interpret the meaning.247  Although the structural reasoning 
method of interpretation reached its high point (or low point, de-
pending on one’s perspective) in Justice William O. Douglas’s opi-
nion in Griswold v. Connecticut,248 it is at least as old as Chief Justice 
John Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland,249 and continues to 
be used by the Supreme Court today.250
Structural reasoning can also play an important part in state con-
stitutional interpretation although it is, quite frankly, a far trickier ex-
 
 
 244. See supra text accompanying notes 223–224. 
 245. See supra text accompanying notes 204–206. 
 246. See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
22 (1969) (speaking of structural reasoning as different from simple text-explication, and 
instead a method of reasoning from structure and relation). 
 247. GERHARDT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY, supra note 84, at 321. 
 248. 381 U.S. 479, 484–85 (1965) (inferring from the various provisions of the Bill of 
Rights a common thread prohibiting government intrusion into individual privacy absent 
compelling circumstances). 
 249. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 426 (1819) (holding that despite the lack of an “express 
provision” prohibiting Maryland from taxing the Bank of the United States, it cannot do so 
because of a “principle which so entirely pervades the constitution, is so intermixed with 
the materials which compose it, so interwoven with its web, so blended with its texture, as 
to be incapable of being separated from it, without rending it into shreds.”). 
 250. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921, 935 (1997) (relying on structural rea-
soning to hold that the Constitution prevents Congress from enlisting state law enforce-
ment to conduct background checks on handgun purchasers); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. 
Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 827 (1995) (relying on structural reasoning regarding to reject 
state imposition of congressional term limits); see also Brannon P. Denning & Glenn Har-
lan Reynolds, Comfortably Penumbral, 77 B.U. L. REV. 1089, 1098–1100 (1997) (describing 
the Supreme Court’s use of structural or “penumbral” reasoning in various cases). 
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ercise.  Professor G. Alan Tarr generally counsels against it: “State 
constitutional provisions should generally be understood as discrete 
units, because state constitutions typically lack a unifying theory or set 
of extraconstitutional assumptions.”251
Maryland’s constitution, since its first drafting in 1776, has always 
been composed of two parts, a declaration of rights and a form of 
government.
  While Dr. Tarr’s assessment 
that repeated constitutional revision and amendment can make it dif-
ficult to extract general structural principles from state constitutions 
is correct, it may still be worth trying.  Again, article III, section 33 
provides an opportunity to do just that. 
252  The Declaration of Rights is intended to describe the 
fundamental rights of humankind.253  By contrast, the form of gov-
ernment provides the concrete rules for the operation of state gov-
ernment.254 Since 1851, the form of government has been divided by 
subject into a series of articles: article I, which concerns the Elective 
Franchise; article II, which concerns the Executive Department; ar-
ticle III, which provides the rules for operation of the Legislative De-
partment; and so on.  Even a cursory review of article III discloses that 
its sections consist of procedural rules, not substantive guaranties.255
The decision by the framers of the 1864 Maryland Constitution 
to place the prohibition against special laws in article III (and the de-
  
Moreover, this basic arrangement has been maintained, despite the 
frequent revisions and amendments the Maryland Constitution has 
undergone. 
 
 251. Tarr, State Constitutions, supra note 183, at 1194.  For a more complete discussion 
about the lack of “constitutional coherence” in state constitutions, see TARR, 
UNDERSTANDING, supra note 88, at 191–94 (concluding that “an interpreter cannot always 
look to the [state constitutional] whole to illuminate the meaning of its various parts”).  
This is the same reason that Professor Amar’s intertextual interpretive theories are unlike-
ly to be helpful in analyzing state constitutional provisions.  See supra text accompanying 
notes 83–88. 
 252. FRIEDMAN, STATE CONSTITUTION, supra note 143, at 2–3. 
 253. Id. at 2. 
 254. See Friedman, supra note 142, at 677 n.3 (noting that the form of government is the 
only document to which the term “constitution” was applied). 
 255. The only arguably close call is article III, section 40 (and its related provisions, ar-
ticle III, sections 40A–C), the principal provision of which provides that “[t]he General 
Assembly shall enact no Law authorizing private property to be taken for public use with-
out just compensation, as agreed upon between the parties, or awarded by a jury, being 
first paid or tendered to the party entitled to such compensation.”  MD. CONST. art. III, 
§ 40.  The federal analog to this provision is found within the Bill of Rights. U.S. CONST. 
amend. V (“nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion”).  Without diminishing the importance of this provision or the property rights that it 
guarantees, it is my view that the State provision, especially with its principal focus on the 
actions of the General Assembly, can properly be regarded as a procedural rule. 
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cision by the 1867 framers to retain it in that location) should give 
rise to the implication, based on the “structure and relation” of the 
constitution, that this provision should be treated more like a proce-
dural rule than a substantive right.256  Thus, structural reasoning sug-
gests that a modern interpreter of article III, section 33 should favor 
an interpretation that treats the provision as a procedural rule, not a 
substantive equality guarantee.257
In this regard, the Maryland framers consciously chose to model 
this provision on article IV, section 22 of the Indiana Constitution of 
1851, but apparently equally consciously chose not to borrow Indi-
ana’s equal privileges and immunities provision.
   
258  That provision, 
which remains a part of Indiana’s Declaration of Rights today, states 
that “[t]he General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of 
citizens, privileges or immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall 
not equally belong to all citizens.”259  The Maryland drafters’ decision 
to omit that provision resonates in historical, comparative, and struc-
tural analyses and suggests that the Maryland drafters consciously and 
intentionally selected a procedural model to follow and placed it with 
other procedural rules.  They chose not to borrow a substantive equal-
ity guarantee, and they were not confused about what they were 
doing.260
Judicial respect for the constitutional decision of coordinate 
branches can appropriately be characterized as a structuralist notion, 
although there is in the Maryland Constitution—unlike the federal 
constitution—textualist support for this separation of powers as 
well.
  Their choices must have implications for our current inter-
pretation. 
261
 
 256. See WILLIAMS, STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 
  By passing a law, the state legislature has—perhaps explicitly 
30, at 278 (“These [special law] 
provisions, although often interpreted and applied as rights provisions, are actually limits 
on the legislative branch”). 
 257. Courts can be more deferential to the legislature when it has arguably violated the 
procedural rules of article III than they are when the legislature has violated the substan-
tive guaranties of the declaration of rights.  See, e.g., Smigiel v. Franchot, 410 Md. 302, 324–
26, 978 A.2d 687, 701 (2009) (finding that legislative adjournment rule, MD. CONST. art. 
III, § 25, is a nonjusticiable controversy, best resolved by the legislature). 
 258. IND. CONST. art. I, § 23.  See 2 DEBATES, supra note 148, at 877 (“Perhaps the most 
full and ample [provision] is that in the constitution of Indiana . . . .”). 
 259. IND. CONST. art. I, § 23. 
 260. Friedman, Tracing the Lineage, supra note 210, at 945–48 (describing intentionality 
in borrowing of state constitutional provisions). 
 261. MD. CONST. Decl. of Rts., art. 8 (“That the Legislative, Executive and Judicial pow-
ers of Government ought to be forever separate and distinct from each other; and no per-
son exercising the functions of one of said Departments shall assume or discharge the du-
ties of any other.”) 
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but certainly implicitly—determined that it is constitutional.262  Ordi-
narily, we would expect courts to defer to that decision by the legisla-
ture.  If the prohibition against special laws exists, however, to prevent 
corrupt legislatures from adopting corrupt legislation, then it would 
be silly to leave its enforcement to the legislature.  That’s the essential 
holding of the Indiana Supreme Court in Thomas v. Board of Commis-
sioners.263  But if, as the history of the Maryland provision tends to sug-
gest, the provision was not intended as a response to legislative cor-
ruption, why shouldn’t the legislature’s constitutional judgments 
about the acceptable forms of classification in legislation be entitled 
to some measure of deference?264  The lack of explicit deference to 
the legislature is an important structuralist criticism of the Cities Service 
test.265
Structural reasoning also urges interpretations that “make 
sense.”
 
266
 
 262. See MD. CONST. art. I, § 9 (explaining the constitutional oath of office requires leg-
islators to execute their office “according to the Constitution and Laws of this State”); see 
also Keyser v. Upshur, 92 Md. 726, 728, 48 A. 399, 400 (1901) (holding that acting in ac-
cordance with constitutional oath becomes part of the duties of the office). 
  One aspect of this should be jurisprudential coherence, 
that similar provisions are given similar interpretations.  The Cities 
Service test violates this interpretive canon.  All laws classify people, if 
only by deciding to whom the law applies.  Using the equal protection 
analysis, and assuming that the legislation does not discriminate on an 
impermissible basis (suspect classification or the exercise of a funda-
mental right), the court will defer to the legislature’s classification so 
long as there is a rational basis.  Courts use this deferential standard 
to reflect respect for the democratically elected legislature’s demo-
cratically selected policy choices.  Under the Cities Service test, howev-
er, the same classification is subjected to a much less deferential stan-
 263. 5 Ind. 4 (1854).  
 264. The Office of the Attorney General, emphasizing a pre-Cities Service test, takes a 
more deferential position in its review of legislation by (1) recognizing that it is the “prov-
ince of the General Assembly” to determine “whether public policy dictates the necessity 
[of a particular piece of legislation] ‘to meet some special evil, or [to] promote some pub-
lic interest, for which the general law is inadequate,’” 66 OP. ATT’Y GEN. 207, 209 (1981) 
(quoting Jones v. House of Reformation, 176 Md. 43, 55–56, 3 A.2d 728, 734 (1939)), and 
(2) applying the presumption of constitutionality that attaches to all legislative enact-
ments.  Id. (citing Salisbury Beauty Sch. v. State Bd. of Cosmetologists, 268 Md. 32, 48, 300 
A.2d 367, 378 (1973)); see also Williams v. Mayor of Balt., 289 U.S. 36, 46 (1933) (emphasiz-
ing judicial deference to legislative determination of need for legislation in deciding spe-
cial laws cases). 
 265. See supra Part II.B. 
 266. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 22 
(1969). 
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dard.267  There is no good reason why less deference should be given 
to the democratically selected policy choices of the legislature here 
than in equal protection.  The same legislative classifications are 
judged by two different standards, implying two different levels of de-
ference to the democratic process.  That does not “make sense.”268
Thus, structural reasoning provides some helpful guidance in in-
terpreting the Maryland special laws provision.  Structural reasoning 
counsels that the special laws provision should be seen as a procedur-
al right that should be given deference by the judiciary.
 
269  Applying 
the interpretative theory of structural reasoning to state constitutions, 
however, is a difficult and often uncertain task.270
F.  “Common Law” Constitutional Interpretation 
  Therefore, struc-
tural reasoning can be helpful, but generally cannot be used alone to 
answer all interpretive questions presented by a state constitutional 
provision. 
David Strauss has argued that the best explanation of the consti-
tutional interpretive model that is actually practiced is common law 
decision making.271  Like traditional common law systems, judges rely 
on precedent, rather than authoritative texts, to determine the Con-
stitution’s meaning.  Professor Strauss does not argue that common 
law constitutional interpretation is the best possible interpretive mod-
el.  Rather, he says that it is “the best way to understand what we are 
doing; the best way to justify what we are doing; and the best guide to 
resolving issues that remain open.”272
Professor Strauss argues that there are two components of com-
mon law constitutional interpretation that, operating together, make 
 
 
 267. See supra notes 69–71 and accompanying text. 
 268. In Days Cove, the Court of Special Appeals began to explore the relationship be-
tween special laws and equal protection.  See Md. Dep’t of the Env’t v. Days Cove Reclama-
tion Co., 200 Md. App. 256, 282–85, 27 A.3d 565, 581–82 (2011).   
 269. See supra text accompanying note 257.  
 270. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
 271. See DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 36 (2010) (noting that “the 
common law approach provides a far better understanding of what our constitutional law 
actually is”); David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 
877, 879 (1996) (arguing that the common law approach is most effective at restraining 
judges).  See also FARBER & SHERRY, SEEKING CERTAINTY, supra note 4, at 152–56 (arguing 
that a common law approach to constitutional interpretation offers a consistent approach 
that also affords the chance to reevaluate the current state of the law). 
 272. Strauss, supra note 271, at 888.  See also FARBER & SHERRY, SEEKING CERTAINTY, su-
pra note 4, at 154 (“To paraphrase Churchill, common law reasoning may be the worst 
possible method of judicial decision, except for all the others.”). 
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this method work: traditionalism and conventionalism.273  Professor 
Strauss’s concept of traditionalism may be generally characterized as a 
general opposition to change.274  Conventionalism, according to Pro-
fessor Strauss, is “the notion that it is more important that some 
things be settled than that they be settled right.”275  Professor Strauss 
argues that these two components explain why the text of the Consti-
tution is sometimes critically important and why it is sometimes, for 
all intents and purposes, ignored, and why the intention of the Fra-
mers is sometimes very important and sometimes ignored.276
Although Professor Strauss is careful never to equate his com-
mon law method of interpretation with the notion of stare decisis in 
constitutional decisions, the similarities are such as to make the com-
parison unavoidable.
 
277  In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the U.S. Su-
preme Court described stare decisis as a rule or a policy, not an “in-
exorable command.”278  The Court stated that it is “customarily 
informed by a series of prudential and pragmatic considerations de-
signed to test the consistency of overruling a prior decision with the 
ideal of the rule of law, and to gauge the respective costs of reaffirm-
ing and overruling a prior case.”279
The difficult balance in deciding whether to affirm or overrule a 
constitutional precedent based on stare decisis (or Professor Strauss’s 
traditionalism and conventionalism) must be recalibrated when ap-
plied to a state supreme court’s interpretation of its state constitution.  
As U.S. Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis stated: “The policy of 
stare decisis may be more appropriately applied to constitutional 
questions arising under the fundamental laws of those States whose 
  The similarities between the Casey 
Court’s description of stare decisis and Professor Strauss’s description 
of the twin components of common law constitutional interpreta-
tion—traditionalism and conventionalism—are obvious. 
 
 273. Strauss, supra note 271, at 890–91. 
 274. See id. at 891–92 (“The central traditionalist idea is that one should be very careful 
about rejecting judgments made by people who were acting reflectively and in good faith, 
especially when those judgments have been reaffirmed or at least accepted over time.”).  
However, Professor Strauss does argue that within the common law approach, “gradual 
innovation” and “[e]ven sudden changes are possible.”  Id. at 935.  
 275. Id. at 907.  Conventionalism, although commonplace with respect to the common 
law, is far more controversial in constitutional interpretation.  
 276. Id. at 896–97 (arguing that traditionalist and conventionalist theories do not une-
quivocally support the text of the Constitution itself; they both must employ various me-
thods of interpretation when the text does not provide a definite answer). 
 277. See id. at 913 (reiterating that common law interpretation is based on precedent). 
 278. 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992). 
 279. Id.  
 464 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:411 
constitution may be easily amended.”280  Subsequent commentators 
have noted that aside from the relative ease of amending state consti-
tutions, noted by Justice Brandeis, there are other factors in state con-
stitutional practice that may require a further recalibration of the stare 
decisis calculation.281  Maryland cases have not explored these ques-
tions with much sophistication.282
How do Professor Strauss’s common law theory of constitutional 
interpretation and the policy of stare decisis help us understand the 
prohibition on special laws in the Maryland Constitution?  It is not 
clear whether Judge Eldridge’s intention in Cities Service was to syn-
thesize existing special laws tests or whether he was fashioning a new 
test.  Of course, there is not a simple answer to this question.  There 
were aspects of the Cities Service test that repeated pre-existing law.  
Some aspects of the Cities Service test that were wholly new, such as the 
“mirror image” suggestion that the provision bans laws that “burden” 
as well as “benefit” a subclass.  And there were aspects of the pre-
existing law that Cities Service failed to mention, such as the strong pre-
sumption of constitutionality of statutes
 
283
 
 280. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 409 n.5 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting). 
 or the use of a reasonable-
 281. See WILLIAMS, STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 30, at 349–50 (noting that even 
Justice Brandeis acknowledged that state legislatures are not hesitant to correct state court 
opinions they deem wrong); James C. Rehnquist, The Power That Shall Be Vested in a 
Precedent: Stare Decisis, the Constitution, and the Supreme Court, 66 B.U. L. REV. 345, 352–53 
(1986) (suggesting that state legislatures can respond to court decisions by creating statu-
tory rights beyond those protected by a court); Mark Sabel, The Role of Stare Decisis in Con-
struing the Alabama Constitution of 1901, 53 ALA. L. REV. 273, 287, 294 (2001) (arguing that 
stare decisis should play a more influential role in the interpretation of the Alabama Consti-
tution); Thad B. Zmistowski, City of Portland v. DePaolo: Defining the Role of Stare Decisis in 
State Constitutional Decisionmaking, 41 ME. L. REV. 201, 221 (1989) (arguing that because the 
Maine Constitution is a common law document, stare decisis should play an integral role in 
its interpretation).  There is an interesting twist here.  Although Justice Brandeis correctly 
points out that constitutional amendment is easier in state constitutions, it strikes me as 
exceedingly unlikely that the state legislature would propose a constitutional amendment 
to overturn a decision which, in effect, expands the legislature’s power to legislate.  Thus, 
a decision overturning the Cities Service precedent in favor of a more deferential standard 
seems unlikely to cause the legislature to propose a constitutional amendment. 
 282. See, e.g., DRD Pool Serv., Inc. v. Freed, 416 Md. 46, 68, 5 A.3d 45, 58 (2010) (noting 
that, in response to the “contention that constitutional precedents are less deserving of 
robust stare decisis protection than are other rulings,” such constitutional “rulings require 
as much deference as non-constitutional cases, and are not less protected by stare decisis 
based solely on their constitutional nature”). 
 283. See, e.g., Beauchamp v. Somerset County Sanitary Comm’n, 256 Md. 541, 547, 261 
A.2d 461, 463–64 (1970) (holding that in Maryland, statutes are presumptively constitu-
tional). 
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ness test to evaluate legislative classifications.284  Reasonable people 
can disagree about the extent to which Judge Eldridge’s Cities Service 
opinion adhered to the “essential holdings” of earlier special laws cas-
es and the extent to which, by adopting a new method of analysis, it 
preserved a mere façade.285
Even if the Cities Service test is improperly formulated, Professor 
Strauss’s common law method counsels us not to reject it lightly.
  Similarly, if the test from Cities Service is 
now to be modified, it is not clear whether that modification ought to 
be characterized as a complete overruling of the prior precedent or 
merely a minor adjustment.  
286  
Doubtless, the test was formulated by “people who were acting reflec-
tively and in good faith,” 287 and that the test has been “accepted over 
time.”288  Moreover, while the Cities Service test may not have been 
formulated perfectly, it may satisfy the test of conventionality: it may 
be good enough.  Similarly, stare decisis counsels caution in overruling 
the Cities Service test.  Using the Casey formulation, we must “test the 
consistency of overruling a prior decision with the ideal rule of law” 
and “gauge the respective costs of reaffirming and overruling a prior 
case.”289
The Cities Service test, however, is a perfect candidate for revision 
under the Casey standard.  The rule has proven unworkable because it 
has provided little helpful guidance for the legislature or for courts.
 
290
 
 284. See, e.g., Littleton v. Hagerstown, 150 Md. 163, 183, 132 A. 773, 778–79 (1926) 
(holding that the basis for a classification must bear a reasonable relation to the goal of 
the legislation). 
  
It has a legion of defects that are cataloged in Part III.B of this Article.  
Fortunately, however, there has been no reliance—in fact there can 
 285. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (O’Connor, 
J., plurality opinion) (reaffirming the “essential holding” of Roe v. Wade); id. at 954 (Scalia, 
J., dissenting). 
 286. See Strauss, supra note 271, at 888 (arguing that within the existing legal frame-
work, the common law model is “the best way to understand what we are doing; the best 
way to justify what we are doing; and the best guide to resolving issues that remain open”). 
 287. Id. at 891.  Perhaps this is the appropriate time, while recognizing that those who 
decided Cities Service were “acting reflectively and in good faith,” to emphasize the high 
esteem in which I hold Judge John C. Eldridge.  A quiet, thoughtful, scholarly man, Judge 
Eldridge is and has long been an excellent appellate judge. 
 288. Id.  It is worth noting that the Cities Service test is far older and has been relied upon 
more frequently by appellate courts than the ruling upholding the constitutionality of the 
cap on noneconomic damages, see Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 342, 601 A.2d 102 (1992), 
which the Court of Appeals recently declared to have “become embedded in the bedrock 
of Maryland law.”  DRD Pool Serv., Inc. v. Freed, 416 Md. 46, 68, 5 A.3d 45, 58 (2010).  
 289. Casey, 505 U.S. at 854. 
 290. See Green v. N.B.S., Inc., 409 Md. 528, 545–46, 976 A.2d 279, 289 (2009) (noting 
that because the statute at issue in Cities Service was incredibly fact-specific, the case does 
not provide useful guidance).  
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be no real reliance—on the Cities Service rule.  The only party whose 
conduct is regulated by the prohibition on special laws—the Maryland 
General Assembly—will thereafter attempt to conform its annual leg-
islative conduct to whatever new standard the court adopts.  Similarly, 
while Professor Strauss’s common law constitutional interpretation 
urges us not to overrule longstanding precedents lightly, it certainly 
does not prohibit judges from adopting “[g]radual innovation[s]” to 
improve a constitutional interpretation.291
Thus, common law constitutional interpretation provides some 
helpful guidance interpreting the Maryland special laws provision.  
Common law constitutional interpretation counsels that the court’s 
opinion in Cities Service may be a suitable candidate for the court to 
revisit and overrule.  
 
V.   APPLYING A COMPOSITE THEORY OF INTERPRETATION TO THE 
SPECIAL LAWS PROVISION 
After independently applying all six theories of constitutional in-
terpretation to the Maryland special laws provision, it is clear that 
none of the six theories can by itself provide the correct interpreta-
tion of the provision.  A textualist is likely to be frustrated because the 
key terms of the Maryland special laws provision were not clearly de-
fined at the time the provision was adopted.292  Originalist theory pro-
vides only the conclusion that the provision’s drafters thought of it as 
a procedural limitation to protect legislators and to protect the sepa-
ration of powers.293  Moral reasoning theory is unlikely to help interp-
ret the special laws provision.294  Structural reasoning suggests that it 
is more likely that the special laws provision should be interpreted as 
a legislative procedural provision, rather than as a substantive equality 
guaranty.295  Comparative constitutional law suggests that Maryland 
might want to follow the examples of its sister states and adopt a more 
deferential standard of review for laws that are alleged to be unconsti-
tutionally special.296
 
 291. See Strauss, supra note 
  Finally, the common law method of constitution-
al interpretation suggests that, although the doctrine of stare decisis 
commends retaining the Cities Service test for special laws, that claim is 
271, at 935 (stating that the common law method does not 
“immunize” precedent from new challenges, but rather encourages the empirical testing 
and re-testing of established legal doctrines). 
 292. See supra Part IV.A. 
 293. See supra Part IV.B.  
 294. See supra Part IV.C.  
 295. See supra Part IV.E.  
 296. See supra Part IV.D. 
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particularly weak here.297
In my view, a judge must use his or her judgment to develop the 
best possible interpretation of a constitutional provision that is con-
strained by a reasonable reading of the constitutional text and in-
formed by the history of that provision’s adoption,
  Individually, these theories each have sub-
stantial weakness; using all six together provides tools that a judge can 
use to successfully interpret the provision.  This example, to me, 
counsels strongly against any foundationalist theory of interpretation, 
or foundationalism generally.  
298 subsequent judi-
cial and scholarly interpretation in this and comparable jurisdictions, 
core moral values, political philosophy, and state as well as American 
traditions.299
Combining what we have learned from each of the interpretive 
techniques and responding to the other criticisms of Cities Service, I 
propose adoption of the following four-part test for evaluating laws 
that are alleged to be special: 
  A judge ought to make use of all possible tools to come 
to a proper interpretation. 
1.  Is there an existing general law on this topic to which the law 
that we are considering provides an exception?  If “yes,” continue.  If 
“no,” the law is constitutional. 
2.  Is the classification drawn by the law unnatural, unreasonable, 
or illogical?  Is the class created by the statute closed?  If “yes” to ei-
ther question, continue.  If “no,” the law is constitutional. 
 
 297. See supra Part IV.F.  
 298. Originalism, shorn of its foundationalist baggage, is just normal historical interpre-
tation, which I view as a particularly valuable tool in constitutional interpretation. 
 299. I was prepared to call this theory a “pragmatic” theory of interpretation.  See Far-
ber, supra note 130, at 1104–06 (explaining that pragmatic constitutional interpretation 
accounts for history and the Framers’ intent, but also considers the flaws in the Framers’ 
thinking, such as adherence to slavery).  On reflection, however, it seems to me that this 
label, while literally correct, may carry too much baggage.  See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, 
HOW JUDGES THINK 232–33 (2008) (describing “coevolution” of philosophical and legal 
pragmatism); Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV. 
1331, 1341–43 (1988) (describing the virtues of pragmatism, but acknowledging that it has 
been the subject of serious criticism); see also Steven D. Smith, The Pursuit of Pragmatism, 
100 YALE L.J. 409, 412–14 (1990) (attempting to make non-pragmatic theorists appear 
pragmatic and pragmatists appear non-pragmatic, in pursuit of the author’s largely anti-
pragmatic agenda).  Professors Farber and Sherry recently published their full scale theo-
retical model, which calls for a constitutional jurisprudence marked by “[r]espect [for] 
precedent, [the] exercise [of] good judgment, provid[ing] reasoned explanations, deli-
ber[ations] with [judicial] colleagues, and keep[ing] in mind . . . responses of critics.”  
FARBER & SHERRY, JUDGMENT CALLS, supra note 119, at 167.  According to Farber and 
Sherry, the “first virtue” of their proposed interpretive theory is “prudence.”  Id.  Whether 
this is “pragmatic” interpretive theory, I can’t say. 
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3.  Does the statute provide an unfair benefit, demonstrate favo-
ritism, or undermine the separation of powers?  If “yes,” continue.  If 
“no,” the law is constitutional. 
4.  Given the presumption of constitutionality that attaches to the 
acts of the legislature, was the decision to grant this benefit to the 
class unreasonable?  If “yes,” the law is unconstitutional.  If “no,” the 
law is constitutional. 
So let’s take it out for a spin.  First, let’s try this new four-part test 
on the mass merchandiser exception to the divestiture law that was 
challenged in Cities Service.  On the first part, which is derived from 
the text of the constitutional provision, it is clear that the mass mer-
chandiser exemption was an exception to a general law requiring gas 
station divestiture.300  On the second part, although it is not plain that 
the classification of mass merchandisers was unnatural, unreasonable, 
or illogical, the class was clearly closed and no future mass merchan-
diser could obtain the benefit.301  Thus, we proceed to the third part 
of the test.  Here, it was clear that the mass merchandiser exemption 
created an unfair benefit to Montgomery Ward that no other mass 
merchandiser could share.302
Now let’s look at Maryland Department of the Environment v. Days 
Cove Reclamation Co., a case dealing with the licensure of rubble land-
fills (and a case in which I represented the State of Maryland).
  We then proceed to the fourth part of 
the test.  It strikes me that, even despite the presumption of constitu-
tionality, the law was unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional.   
303  The 
law challenged in this case provides an exception to the general law 
by providing that in certain parts of the state—namely near Unicorn 
Lake and near certain Potomac River tributaries—no licenses may be 
issued.304  So, because there is an existing general law, we proceed to 
the second part.  The two parties strenuously debated whether the 
classification drawn by the statute is unnatural, unreasonable, or illog-
ical.305
 
 300. Cities Serv. Co. v. Governor, 290 Md. 553, 577, 431 A.2d 663, 676–77 (1981). 
  While I do not and cannot concede the point, let’s assume for 
now that the classification fails this part of the test.  So we proceed to 
part three.  The statute does not create an unfair benefit to anyone.  
It does not create favoritism.  And there is no implication for the se-
 301. See id. at 570–71, 431 A.2d at 673 (noting that the company in question was the on-
ly subsidiary of an oil producer or refiner that could qualify for the statutory exemption).  
 302. See id. 
 303. Days Cove Reclamation Co. v. Md. Dep’t of Env’t, No. 24-C-07-003455, slip op. at 2–
4 (Md. Cir. Ct. Balt. Aug. 25, 2008), rev’d, 200 Md. App. 256, 27 A.3d 565 (2011).  
 304. Id. at 3–4.  
 305. Id. at 5 n.7. 
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paration of powers.  Therefore, based on the third part of the test, the 
statute is constitutional.306  That’s the same result that the Court of 
Special Appeals reached using the traditional Cities Service test.307
This proposed test is faithful to the text of the Maryland Consti-
tution, as well as to its history, structure, and values.  It is consistent 
with and commended by the jurisprudence of our sister jurisdictions.  
And while it would supplant the Cities Service test, given the limited re-
liance, it will not destabilize existing expectations.  And, at least on 
these two examples, it comes to the right conclusion. 
 
Despite this, some may view this new proposal as too deferential 
to the legislature.  This criticism is misplaced.  First, this is an area in 
which explicit deference to the legislative policy choices of a demo-
cratically-elected state legislature is appropriate.  As the Court of Ap-
peals said long ago, “[T]he constitutional provision was wisely de-
signed to prevent the dispensation or grant of special privileges to 
special interests, . . . it was never intended . . . to foreclose the sove-
reign the right to pass special legislation to serve a particular need, to 
meet some special evil, or to promote some public interest, for which 
the general law is inadequate.”308
Second, despite the fact that the Cities Service test for special laws 
gives the appearance of liberality, it is not generally applied so loosely.  
In 150 years of special laws litigation, in fact, the Court of Appeals has 
invalidated laws as violating the prohibition only eight times.
 
309
Thus, a combined theory of constitutional interpretation is suc-
cessful in interpreting the special laws provision of the Maryland Con-
stitution.  The test created by this method of interpretation follows 
the text, history, structure, and values of the Maryland Constitution.  
  Thus, 
while the Cities Service test may appear liberal, that appearance may, in 
practice, be somewhat deceptive.  If adopted, this proposed test will 
be easier for the legislature and courts to apply, but would be unlikely 
to change the outcomes in many cases. 
 
 306. See Md. Dep’t of the Env’t v. Days Cove Reclamation Co., 200 Md. App. 256, 27 
A.3d 565 (2011).   
 307. Id. 
 308. Jones v. House of Reformation, 176 Md. 43, 56, 3 A.2d 728, 734 (1938) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 309. Cities Serv. Co. v. Governor, 290 Md. 553, 570, 431 A.2d 663, 673 (1981); Beau-
champ v. Somerset County Sanitary Comm’n, 256 Md. 541, 549, 261 A.2d 461, 464 (1970); 
Littleton v. Hagerstown, 150 Md. 163, 183, 132 A. 773, 781 (1926); Westminster v. Consol. 
Pub. Utils. Co., 132 Md. 374, 379, 103 A. 1008, 1009 (1918); Crisfield v. Chesapeake & Po-
tomac Tel. Co., 131 Md. 444, 448, 102 A. 751, 752 (1918); State v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 
113 Md. 179, 187, 77 A. 433, 435 (1910); Mayor of Balt. v. Starr Methodist Protestant 
Church, 106 Md. 281, 289, 67 A. 261, 265 (1907); Mayor of Balt. v. Allegany County, 99 
Md. 1, 12–13, 57 A. 632, 636 (1904).  
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The test is consistent with the jurisprudence of Maryland’s sister 
states.  The test is consistent with the doctrine of stare decisis.  Allowing 
a judge to make use of all available resources, including all six me-
thods of constitutional interpretation, rather than limiting to a single 
foundationalist method, successfully interprets a state constitutional 
provision. 
 
